A bad week for Oracle - their health business and underlying cloud platform has suffered multiple massive breeches with damming evidence, and overt denial, minimisation of the matter.
Community likeness of Oracle has been missing for a while. Will Postgres, MySQL, or MongoDB ever be considered for similar EMS use cases? What FOSS product can replace Oracle today because there just hasn't been much replacing of high scaled Oracle anywhere except at Amazon? Every single medical provider today relies on Oracle.
I think Oracle can do a couple of things slightly better than others (db performance/features), which seems to be all it takes to be forever entrenched and unmovable in an enterprise/legacy codebase.
I don't think this class of customers care much about OSS. Vendor costs are an accepted business expense, passed onto customers, funded by tax dollars. Why would these big players dance around trying to get what they need from OSS when there's this "tried and true" vendor already proven.
Sure they're greasy, unhelpful, extorters... but hey... "this is big business baby! You gotta tango with the big boys if you wanna play ball in this field, bucko" :_)
Oracle are not a very big deal in healthcare in Europe, as I’ve understood it. They arr trying to sell here, but it’s tough when your product is from the 90’s and doesn’t fit European single-payer healthcare systems very well.
I believe Signal also is unable to have a presence in Australia due to its "backdooring" privacy laws. Not sure how they deliver their app into Australian App stores?
It's just mind-boggling that their architecture allows this to happen so quickly IMO. There are so many resources and dependencies, that completely nuking a cloud account cannot and should not be easy or fast... and should not actually be possible by the cloud vendor.
I suppose they need to guard against anyone setting up costly infrastructure and doing a "runner" (allowing a credit card to lapse) - in that scenario - deleting all the customers data should be the absolute last resort - after it's been reasonably determined they are being malicious.
How does AWS manage these scenarios? I'm sure they follow-up multiple times before hitting the nuke button. In-fact - they know and treat their "larger accounts" with special privileges and assurances. Unisuper is not a small fish.
Imagine a political system that was filled with randomly selected people rather than those motivated by power.
It could work. Since anyone can do the job of a politician imo... it's not like medicine or engineering that requires hard skills. :laugh:
I guess for the back-end it's a little more difficult to verify? But i'm guessing Signal's security architecture is such that with a verifiable client build it would be tricky to mess with the server?
"Originally designed for DRM applications, most SGX examples imagine an SGX enclave running on a client. This would allow a server to stream media content to a client enclave with the assurance that the client software requesting the media is the “authentic” software that will play the media only once, instead of custom software that reverse engineered the network API call and will publish the media as a torrent instead.
However, we can invert the traditional SGX relationship to run a secure enclave on the server. An SGX enclave on the server-side would enable a service to perform computations on encrypted client data without learning the content of the data or the result of the computation."
I know companies and module developers _say_ they run the code which is publicly viewable on GitHub. But how can we be sure the server or client does not have additional code injected during the build process which would invalidate the otherwise secure framework they present to the public?
reply