> most lived at subsistence levels with starvation always at their doorstep
Genuine question: is this something we know from evidence, or an assumption? I vaguely recall having read that comparison between skeletal remains of early farmers and hunter-gatherers indicated that the latter had a better diet, but I'm not sure if I'm remembering correctly or how much that observation generalizes.
Both early farmers and hunter-gatherers regularly endured calorie scarcity. The difference between them along this dimension is minor compared to the difference between either group and us and our calorie security.
AFAIK the first somewhat widely-known language to do this was Haskell (through libraries). I'm not 100% clear on the entire history, but I think it goes something like:
1. Initially there was no way to do effects in Haskell, everything was pure.
2. Then it was realized that IO can be modeled with monads, so the IO type and do notation were added.
3. Gradual realization that monads can be used to also constrain effects, ie you can construct a type of "stateful computations" that can read and write to a specific state, but not touch other states or write to disk or something.
4. Monad transformers are invented, which allow stacking monads on top of eachother to support multiple effects. Together with type classes, this gets us pretty close to extensible effects (the approach used in Flix, if I understand it correctly). So for example you can express that your function needs to write to a log and may exit early with an error message with the constraints `(MonadWriter w m, MonadError e m) => ... -> m resultType`, and you can then use monad transformers to build a stack that provides both of these effects.
5. Monad transformers have some issues though: they affect performance significantly and the interaction between effects is tricky to reason about. So an alternative is sought and found in extensible effects. The initial proposals were, iirc, based on free monads, but those aren't great for performance either, so ever since there has been a whole zoo of different effects and handlers implementations that all make different trade-offs and compromises, of which I think the `effectful` library is now the de facto default, and I think what it offers is quite similar to the Flix language's effect system (I'm not sure on what finer points it differs).
> I'm not 100% clear on the entire history, but I think it goes something like:
You can see my talk "A History of Effect Systems" for a synopsys of the history. I gave it at Zurihac this year. It's very close to the history you gave (though I think point 1 is not right: Haskell always had a way to do IO)
Especially the set example is also just confusing for 7th grade kids (or anyone who doesn't already understand sets, really). It's technically correct to say that you can store the unique ingredients of a recipe in a set, but that's not an obviously useful thing to do (if you want to compose a shopping list, you need the quantities as well), so the example doesn't actually illustrate anything that helps make sets more intuitive to the student. I think many, if not most, kids of that age will also not even correctly parse the phrasing "list all the unique ingredients" (not to speak of the unfortunate phrasing "a set can be used to list all ..." while you're trying to illustrate the difference between a list and a set).
> The government is not prosecuting for speech, which is what the free speech protections can and should guarantee.
This has absolutely started happening, albeit not yet on a large-scale, systematic basis. Mahmoud Khalil [0] resided in the US legally when he was detained with the intention to deport.
That would be a crime. Khalil was not charged with any crime. The only conceivable reason to not charge him at this point, is because there is no evidence of him committing a crime.
It's not undemocratic. The behavior of the parliament reflects the reality that only a tiny minority of the population care at all about this issue.
One might be tempted to blame a lack of media attention, but I don't think that's it. For example in the US, the Snowden revelations attracted tons and tons of media attention, yet it never became a major topic in elections, as far as I'm aware. No politician's career was ended over it, and neither did new politicians rise based on a platform of privacy-awareness. No one talks about mass surveillance today. No one cares. There is no reason to believe that the situation is different in Europe.
Parliamentary democracy just fundamentally has a weakness when it comes to single-issue voting. After picking a party to vote on based on housing, economic policy, crime, ..., how much voting power so to say is left for.. which guy the party says they'll send to the european commission? And what that guy's stance on chat-control is? If they're even publicizing that...
I think the primary positive feature of democracy is simply that we have regular peaceful transitions of power. I'm not sure that the fact that the people choose their own leaders by itself leads to higher quality leadership, or even leadership that cares more about said people. But the fact that the baton passes every couple of years is absolutely invaluable.
More expressive voting systems help. If your vote has meaning when cast for something other than 1 of 2 platforms it can encode more of your preferences. Referendums are also not the only variety of direct democracy, you can have sortition.
How many people participate in party candidate selection at all... it's a mixed bag to "primary" out an incumbent... sometimes it's easy as they don't see it coming or a threat... others the entrenchment goes deep.
I watched this video years ago and found it interesting. It's a talk by Kevin Buzzard, a pure mathematician who got really interested in theorem proving software, and he explains his motivation.
That does not resolve your problem, it only shuffles it around.
You are defending the case that personhood begins at conception, and your argument supporting this case is "It's a unique living organism. A life. Different from a skin cell which isn't a unique organism."
If I get a kidney from someone else, and that person dies, according to your own argument, that kidney is a person. These cells are metabolizing and dividing, therefore alive, and they are unique with respect to the rest of my body.
Perhaps you'll argue that the kidney isn't an organism because it has no means of reproducing itself. To that I have two counterarguments:
- The argument implies that infertile humans are not persons.
- Nature contains every horror imaginable, including clonally transmissible cancers [0]. If my body develops such a cancer and it jumps to someone else, then I die, according to your definition my cancer that's colonizing someone else's body is a person.
I won't claim to know what defines personhood, but an obvious prerequisite (in the context of human life) is the existence of a centralized nervous system. If I am beheaded, and my headless body is placed on life support while my brain is destroyed, I, as a person, am dead, even if my body is alive. If my brain is surgically removed and placed on life support in a vat, and allowed to interface with the world somehow, then I, as a person, am still alive (whether such a life is worth living is a different question).
Accepting this prerequisite resolves the chimera problem, the kidney problem, the infertility problem and the transmissible cancer, and it results in the conclusion that a zygote is not yet a person, as it does not have a nervous system.
Does the kidney meet the scientific definition of an organism?
If we were to survey those biologists, what would they say? Same regarding an infertile person, and cancer. I think scientists have already resolved the questions you're posing.
BTW, I don't think the nervous system argument is very common. Pro life people won't use it, because it means early abortions would be ok. Most pro choice people won't use it, because it means abortions would have to be very restricted. The nervous system starts to form at 3 weeks of fetal age (5 weeks gestational age). Most people are in a tail-wagging-the-dog situation where their beliefs about personhood are derived from their belief about whether abortion should be legal or not, instead of the other way around. I see you haven't fallen into that trap. It does seem possible I have fallen into the trap. However, I do think science is on my side.
> If we were to survey those biologists, what would they say? Same regarding an infertile person, and cancer. I think scientists have already resolved the questions you're posing.
If a definition exists that avoids all these edge cases, please provide it. I am not aware of a definition of "organism" that would resolve all the problems in your stance.
> Most pro choice people won't use it, because it means abortions would have to be very restricted.
The most common pro-choice argument is based on bodily autonomy, for which the personhood of the fetus is irrelevant. It suffices to observe that there is no other situation where the law prioritizes one's duty to care for another over one's bodily autonomy, so even if the fetus is a person, the state cannot force you to carry them to term.
So you are technically correct in stating that it is rarely used as a defense for the pro-choice position, but not "because it means abortions would have to be very restricted". In the bodily autonomy argument, the personhood of the fetus is irrelevant.
I agree with the bodily autonomy argument and the broader pro-choice position, but in this case I'm not really making a political argument, but a philosophical one, which is: it's a mistake to strongly identify personhood with the property of "being an organism" / "being alive".
>If a definition exists that avoids all these edge cases, please provide it. I am not aware of a definition of "organism" that would resolve all the problems in your stance.
One way to define a human is any living entity that is either an adult human, or will/would grow into an adult human as long as no problem has happened or will happen to the entity.
> It suffices to observe that there is no other situation where the law prioritizes one's duty to care for another over one's bodily autonomy
>In the bodily autonomy argument, the personhood of the fetus is irrelevant.
I don't think that's right. Let's say there are 2 people: A and B. Both are innocent. Person A has some bodily suffering. The only way to solve it is to kill person B. So the options are to restore person A to full bodily health and completely destroy person B's bodily health (violating person B's bodily autonomy completely) or to leave the situation as-is, where person A has has only partial bodily health but person B has full bodily health (violating person A's bodily autonomy partially). I think the correct option is to leave the situation as-is, because that violates bodily autonomy the least.
Of course even better is for other people to give aid to person A to reduce the suffering as much as possible without hurting person B.
> One way to define a human is any living entity that is either an adult human, or will/would grow into an adult human as long as no problem has happened or will happen to the entity.
A few posts back you complained about "tail-wagging-the-dog" thinking, where one reasons backwards from the conclusions one wishes to reach. Your definition is obviously a product of that style of thinking: instead of clarifying what is or isn't a human, you will use the natural elasticity of terms like "problem" and "entity" to draw your boundary however you wish, based on pre-existing notions, when confronted with a challenge.
For example, if a child dies from starvation, therefore not growing into adulthood, you will of course say that the lack of nutrients is a problem that prevented this child from reaching adulthood, so it's still a human.
But if an unfertilized egg dies due to not being fertilized, I'm sure you would argue that "not being fertilized" doesn't count as a problem; or alternatively, that the fertilized egg is a different entity from the unfertilized egg. But none of this follows naturally from the definition, it requires our notions of "problem" and "entity" to be perfectly aligned to begin with. And you will pick your understanding of "problem" and "entity" based on wanting to prove that the unfertilized egg isn't a human but the starving child is.
Or imagine a child that is born with a mutation that prevents it from reaching adulthood. Clearly we both want to consider this child human. But I would argue that no problem ever "happened" to this entity: the mutation is part of what defines the entity, there is no alternative hypothetical future where it could reach adulthood. According to your definition I could not call this child a human.
> The draft. And a lot of other military rules.
The draft is an example of the state overruling an individual's bodily autonomy, but I specifically said "[...] where the law prioritizes one's duty to care for another over one's bodily autonomy". The draft is not an example of that: it is a case where the law prioritizes protecting the interests/preservation of the state over another's bodily autonomy, which might in some cases coincide with caring for others, but it clearly doesn't have to.
> The captain has a duty to save passengers first before saving self.
Yes, you can enter an agreement with another party where you make a legally binding promise to perform some duty that overrides your bodily autonomy. This is not an example of the law overriding your bodily autonomy, it's an example of how you can use the law to relinquish your own right to bodily autonomy. Getting pregnant does not require such a legally binding promise.
> I don't think that's right [...]
I'm irrefutably correct that the bodily autonomy argument does not depend on the fetus being a person or not. It's a sufficiently prominent argument that it has a section on the "abortion debate" page on wikipedia [0]. Perhaps the argument does not convince you, but that was not my point. I only wished to show that you are mistaken about the pro-choice position being dependent on the non-personhood of the fetus.
At present I'm not interested in starting a parallel discussion about the validity of the bodily autonomy argument. I can leave a video link [1] if you're interested in how it responds to the most obvious challenges, but I will not return to it unless, maybe, the personhood thread is resolved (to avoid a branching tree discussion).
>But if an unfertilized egg dies due to not being fertilized, I'm sure you would argue that "not being fertilized" doesn't count as a problem; or alternatively, that the fertilized egg is a different entity from the unfertilized egg. But none of this follows naturally from the definition, it requires our notions of "problem" and "entity" to be perfectly aligned to begin with. And you will pick your understanding of "problem" and "entity" based on wanting to prove that the unfertilized egg isn't a human but the starving child is.
I think there's a clear biological difference between an entity receiving nutrition, and 2 entities, each with half of a set of DNA, coming together to make a single entity with a full set of DNA.
>it is a case where the law prioritizes protecting the interests/preservation of the state over another's bodily autonomy, which might in some cases coincide with caring for others, but it clearly doesn't have to.
What you're saying seems to be that it's ok for the state to mandate citizens protect the state, but not ok for the state to mandate citizens protect the people in the state. My response is (1) mandating citizens protect the state is protecting the people in the state, and (2) if there was some hypothetical case where citizens protecting the state didn't protect the people in the state, I don't see how it would be morally ok for the state to mandate citizens protect the state, but not ok for the state to mandate citizens protect the people in the state.
> I think there's a clear biological difference between an entity receiving nutrition, and 2 entities, each with half of a set of DNA, coming together to make a single entity with a full set of DNA.
The difference is "clear" to you because you are reasoning backwards from a desired conclusion. You want to claim that the zygote is a person and the unfertilized egg is not, so of course the merger of DNA is the "clear" boundary between entities to you.
But this boundary just doesn't work very well. To begin with you ignored the "child with deadly mutation" challenge I presented: the only way the child reaches adulthood is if we modify its genes, which you seem to imply makes it a different entity.
And if we dig a bit deeper, the criterion by which you disqualify the unfertilized egg from being considered human also disqualifies the fertilized egg. It too is an entity which can meld with other entities to form a single entity (chimerism, as we discussed), and it can even do the opposite: identical twins start as one zygote that splits at a later point in its development.
I'm not sure even adult humans would qualify for being human in your worldview, come to think of it. Some people have had their brain halves separated during their lifetime, and this seems to lead to two separate persons locked in one body, at least in some cases (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Split-brain).
At this point, you can start overfitting your definition to draw an absurdly jagged boundary exactly around these counterexamples, but at that point I'd appreciate if you just admit that personhood starting at fertilization is just an axiom for you and everything else follows from it.
> What you're saying seems to be that it's ok for the state to mandate citizens protect the state, but not ok for the state to mandate citizens protect the people in the state.
That is very much not what I am saying, but I wasn't very explicit about the point I was making, so I shall clarify.
Two people can disagree about what they think the law should say, but one thing that all decent people would agree on, is that the law should be consistent. We want it to apply evenly to all, without strange exceptions. We don't want any laws that say "everyone is free, except people born in May, they have to do slave labor in the mines."
I was not making an argument about what the law should be, I was arguing that abortion laws make the law inconsistent, as there is no other case where the state violates the bodily autonomy of one person to force them to care for another. For example, if we are in a remote area and I get badly injured, and you are the only person with a compatible blood type nearby, the state can't force you to donate your blood to me.
My point was that it's inconsistent to say that the state can violate one person's bodily autonomy to keep another alive specifically in the case of pregnancy. If you want to make this consistent, you need to allow the state to do this in all cases, implying among other things forced blood transfusions and forced kidney donations. Perhaps you agree that the state should be able to force people to donate blood or a kidney, and in that case your opinion is consistent.
I wasn't expressing agreement or disagreement with the draft. I was stating that it is irrelevant as a counterexample. That's because the justification for the draft rests on a moral principle that's distinct from the one that justifies abortion laws (ie "citizens' bodily autonomy can be violated to defend the state" vs "citizens' bodily autonomy can be violated to save any individual's life"). Again, I deliberately offer no opinion on whether the draft is justified; for my purposes it's enough to show that it is not relevant as a counterexample.
>The difference is "clear" to you because you are reasoning backwards from a desired conclusion. You want to claim that the zygote is a person and the unfertilized egg is not, so of course the merger of DNA is the "clear" boundary between entities to you.
I'm not making up this boundary. This is the scientific definition of an organism.
>To begin with you ignored the "child with deadly mutation" challenge I presented:
The deadly mutation would be the "problem [that] has happened or will happen to the entity." So it doesn't contradict my previous definition. Regardless of whether the deadly mutation could be fixed by gene modification or not, the child is still a person.
>if we modify its genes, which you seem to imply makes it a different entity.
I don't think I said that.
>And if we dig a bit deeper, the criterion by which you disqualify the unfertilized egg from being considered human also disqualifies the fertilized egg. It too is an entity which can meld with other entities to form a single entity (chimerism, as we discussed), and it can even do the opposite: identical twins start as one zygote that splits at a later point in its development.
I'm not sure either of those contradict my previous definition. The chimerism can be considered a problem that will happen. Regarding identical twins, we could argue whether "grow into an adult human" covers "grow into 2 adult humans" or not.
We can modify the definition slightly to avoid these ambiguities: "Any living entity that is either an adult human, or will/would grow into an adult human as long as no problem has happened or will happen to the entity and the typical development process proceeds."
>I'm not sure even adult humans would qualify for being human in your worldview, come to think of it. Some people have had their brain halves separated during their lifetime, and this seems to lead to two separate persons locked in one body, at least in some cases (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Split-brain).
I'm not sure how that situation in any way would lead to a strange interaction with my definition (old or new definitions). My definition would classify that person as a person.
>but at that point I'd appreciate if you just admit that personhood starting at fertilization is just an axiom for you and everything else follows from it.
The axiom for me is that there's no such thing as a partial person. From that axiom, the only logical conclusion I can see is that personhood begins at fertilization.
>as there is no other case where the state violates the bodily autonomy of one person to force them to care for another.
What about child neglect laws? Those restrict the parents' autonomy.
>For example, if we are in a remote area and I get badly injured, and you are the only person with a compatible blood type nearby, the state can't force you to donate your blood to me.
Generally the state's laws forbid one person from taking actions that would violate the rights of another person. For example, if I'm dying and need a kidney, it's not legal for me to forcefully take a kidney from someone else, even if that's the only way to preserve my bodily rights (avoiding death).
I think that is consistent to the state making it not legal for a mother to kill a fetus (assuming the state views the fetus as a person), even if that's the only way for the mother to preserve her bodily rights.
> I'm not making up this boundary. This is the scientific definition of an organism.
To begin with, you did not volunteer a definition for the term "organism"; you limited yourself to attempting defining "human". This was rhetorically a good move, because defining the term "organism" is significantly harder.
You keep repeating that your definition is scientific, but offer no evidence of this. I argue that no such definition exists. The wikipedia page for the term "organism" starts as follows:
> An organism is any living thing that functions as an individual. Such a definition raises more problems than it solves, not least because the concept of an individual is also difficult. Several criteria, few of which are widely accepted, have been proposed to define what constitutes an organism.
> > if we modify its genes, which you seem to imply makes it a different entity.
> I don't think I said that.
> >And if we dig a bit deeper, the criterion by which you disqualify the unfertilized egg from being considered human also disqualifies the fertilized egg. It too is an entity which can meld with other entities to form a single entity (chimerism, as we discussed), and it can even do the opposite: identical twins start as one zygote that splits at a later point in its development.
> I'm not sure either of those contradict my previous definition. The chimerism can be considered a problem that will happen. Regarding identical twins, we could argue whether "grow into an adult human" covers "grow into 2 adult humans" or not.
You forget that my statement was a reply to something you said after you stated your definition. You argued that an unfertilized egg cannot be considered a person because it is "clearly" a different entity from the fertilized egg. That does not follow from your definition, because you don't define the term "entity" anywhere.
All my counterexamples were further attempts to divine what you mean by "entity" (which is an absolutely load-bearing concept in your definition which, again, you leave undefined). If you object to the unfertilized egg being the same entity as the fertilized egg, my hypotheses about your understanding of "entity" are that either changing the genome means that it becomes a different entity (generating the deadly mutation challenge), or merging two entities makes them a distinct entity from either original (generating the chimerism example).
My reasoning was a bit loose regarding the identical twins and split-brain examples: I implicitly generalized your potential objection to mergers to an objection to changes in cardinality. I personally don't see why one would reject mergers but accept splits, but that's not an inconsistent position.
At the moment I still don't know why you believe the unfertilized egg is necessarily a different entity from the zygote. Your response to the chimerism example provides no clarification on this: I was clearly challenging your notion of entity, but you responded only with that it "can be considered a problem that can happen".
> The axiom for me is that there's no such thing as a partial person. From that axiom, the only logical conclusion I can see is that personhood begins at fertilization.
I strongly disagree with this axiom. At some point in the distant past, our ancestors were non-human (and, possibly but not necessarily at the same time, not persons). The logical conclusion from your axiom is that there was, at some point, a hard boundary where an entirely nonperson animal gave birth to a "full person" human (and that first human then presumably had to reproduce through bestiality, unless through some amazing fortune another full 100% human being was born and fertile during their fertile years).
This seems to me a significantly less reasonable reading of reality than describing this as a gradual process towards personhood/humanity, where each successive generation is "more personlike". I find this also a more moral reading of reality: to me clearly an ape or an octopus is more personlike than a cockroach, which is in turn a bit more personlike than a jellyfish, which is a tiny tiny bit more personlike than a sea sponge.
> What about child neglect laws? Those restrict the parents' autonomy.
Correct. But it does not restrict their bodily autonomy. I don't think parents can be forced to donate blood or organs to their offspring. Of course most would without a second thought, but not because it is obligated by law.
> Generally the state's laws forbid one person from taking actions that would violate the rights of another person [...] I think that is consistent to the state making it not legal for a mother to kill a fetus [...]
There's a contrived "standard thought experiment" that responds to this: suppose A kidnaps B, ties them down, and connects B's bloodstream to an entirely innocent C with kidney failure, so that B's kidneys process C's blood. Disconnecting B from C will result in the death of C (assume there is no way around this). In this case the status quo is that B is keeping C alive, and it requires active intervention to change this situation. Does B now have a moral duty to remain physically connected to C at all times? Does B "kill" C if they disconnect the bloodstreams?
If you believe that it is, your opinion is consistent. If it's not, then you must at least permit abortion in the case of rape, even if the fetus is a person.
> Such a definition raises more problems than it solves,
That's a good point. However, none of the examples of situations where the definition is debatable apply to humans. The page lists viruses, colonial organisms, zooids, and collaboration organisms. I think for humans (which I think is the most widely studied organism), scientists can clearly define what is an organism and what isn't.
I think if you were to survey biologists, the vast majority (95%+) would agree with me on all the cases ("is this specific thing a human organism") you listed.
>"entity" (which is an absolutely load-bearing concept in your definition which, again, you leave undefined)
Ok. Let's define it as "a cell or group of cells that are joined together and acting together".
>You argued that an unfertilized egg cannot be considered a person because it is "clearly" a different entity from the fertilized egg.
I said "I think there's a clear biological difference between an entity receiving nutrition, and 2 entities, each with half of a set of DNA, coming together to make a single entity with a full set of DNA."
My point was that there's a clear difference between receiving nutrition and 2 entities with half a set of DNA coming together. My point wasn't that the unfertilized egg and fertilized egg are clearly different entities (as you've pointed out, that's not exactly clear, and depends on the definition entity).
My definition doesn't hinge on the unfertilized egg and fertilized egg being different entities. An unfertilized egg won't typically grow into an adult human. A fertilized egg will typically grow into an adult human.
>At some point in the distant past, our ancestors were non-human (and, possibly but not necessarily at the same time, not persons). The logical conclusion from your axiom is that there was, at some point, a hard boundary where an entirely nonperson animal gave birth to a "full person" human (and that first human then presumably had to reproduce through bestiality, unless through some amazing fortune another full 100% human being was born and fertile during their fertile years).
That's a good point. One thing though is that our actions today can't impact people in the past. So from an ethics point of view, we don't need to worry about the past, only the present and future. And as you say, we don't 100% know what happened in the past.
With the partial people view, someone might conclude today a person with a certain genetic disorder is similar to an ape, and thus a partial person, and thus doesn't need rights. By saying "no partial people today", we avoid that problem.
>If you believe that it is, your opinion is consistent. If it's not, then you must at least permit abortion in the case of rape, even if the fetus is a person.
I would say the way to resolve this is by defining what is the standard care that each person deserves.
If someone needs an exotic treatment that costs $1B/day to survive each day, and a hospital has the treatment in stock, is the hospital obligated to provide it to someone who can't pay? I would say no. It's within the hospital's rights to not give the person the treatment, or cease treatment if already provided in previous days.
However, is it within the hospital's rights to cease providing the person food and water against the person's will? (Let's avoid the euthanasia discussion and say the person is fully responsive but is quadriplegic.) I would say no. Food and water are standard care, and cannot be denied.
Food and water are standard care. The $1B treatment isn't.
2 people being attached permanently for the purpose of blood processing of a failed kidney isn't standard care.
A mother's womb is standard care for a fetus.
(Another thing to consider is what direct action is taken. In a D&E abortion, the fetus is cut into pieces with a scissors, which is the cause of death. So in the specific case of a D&E abortion, there's a second clear difference from the blood treatment case, in that it's a direct physical attack on the fetus that kills the fetus. E.g. in the kidney failure case, would it be ok to cut the person into pieces with a chainsaw? No, even if the person already is going to die of kidney failure. Other types of abortion are not as direct though, so this argument can't be as clearly used to condemn all types of abortion.)
I'll re-order a bit based on perceived importance.
> That's a good point. One thing though is that our actions today can't impact people in the past. So from an ethics point of view, we don't need to worry about the past, only the present and future. And as you say, we don't 100% know what happened in the past.
> With the partial people view, someone might conclude today a person with a certain genetic disorder is similar to an ape, and thus a partial person, and thus doesn't need rights. By saying "no partial people today", we avoid that problem.
Here it's important to remember exactly what positions we are defending. The viewpoint you have been defending is not merely that we should, for ethical reasons, consider the zygote to be a person. You are defending a much stronger claim, which is that denying that the zygote is a person goes against our current scientific understanding.
To be absolutely clear: I don't think that your belief that the zygote is a person is unscientific or demonstrably wrong (although I believe there are more sensible candidates for boundaries). What's more is that I understand the need for a "legal fiction" around personhood: a legal definition that is deliberately too broad, stemming from a hopefully broadly shared sense that we should try very hard to avoid false negatives.
However, I am very certain that this conviction is not a scientific necessity. It's specifically this part of your claim I am addressing with the "nonhuman ancestors" example. My claim is that science simply does not provide us with a clean boundary between persons and non-persons. Whatever boundary we are going to come up with for legal and moral reasons is going to be somewhat arbitrary, probably based on drawing the boundary a bit too broad.
You claim that your belief that the zygote is a person follows logically from the axiom that personhood is always non-partial. I agree with this as a legal fiction. But from a philosophical or scientific point of view, this is simply disprovable. If you accept that my nonhuman ancestors example disproves your axiom of non-partiality of personhood in the domain of philosphy/science (not in the domain of law), then:
- you can continue to believe that we should consider the zygote as a full person
- but, your argument that it is logically or scientifically necessary to consider the zygote as a person collapses.
> 2 people being attached permanently for the purpose of blood processing of a failed kidney isn't standard care.
I feel like your entire argument here rests on the idea that the attachment is permanent, making your sacrifice much greater than that of a pregnant woman. If we contrive a reason why, for example, you would only need to be attached for a month or week or so, this argument evaporates. If you need to provide your kidneys for the duration of one week, then your sacrifice is clearly much less than that of a pregnant woman. On what basis can the state then force a pregnant woman to stay pregnant for nine months, but not force you to remain a living dialysis machine for a week?
> My definition doesn't hinge on the unfertilized egg and fertilized egg being different entities. An unfertilized egg won't typically grow into an adult human. A fertilized egg will typically grow into an adult human.
Retracing this thread in the conversation, I'm getting confused about what your exact position here is. This is what I said earlier:
> Me: But if an unfertilized egg dies due to not being fertilized, I'm sure you would argue that "not being fertilized" doesn't count as a problem; or alternatively, that the fertilized egg is a different entity from the unfertilized egg. But none of this follows naturally from the definition, it requires our notions of "problem" and "entity" to be perfectly aligned to begin with. And you will pick your understanding of "problem" and "entity" based on wanting to prove that the unfertilized egg isn't a human but the starving child is.
So you must either claim that it's a different entity, or that not being fertilized doesn't count as a "problem". The thread continues:
> You: I think there's a clear biological difference between an entity receiving nutrition, and 2 entities, each with half of a set of DNA, coming together to make a single entity with a full set of DNA.
> Me: The difference is "clear" to you because you are reasoning backwards from a desired conclusion. You want to claim that the zygote is a person and the unfertilized egg is not, so of course the merger of DNA is the "clear" boundary between entities to you.
> You: I'm not making up this boundary. This is the scientific definition of an organism.
Because of this quote, I was convinced that out of the "problem" and "entity" objections, you picked the "entity" one; that is, you respond to my challenge that the unfertilized egg can be considered a human being in your definition by stating that it is a different entity from the unfertilized egg, not that "not being fertilized" doesn't count as a problem.
But then in your most recent post you state "My point wasn't that the unfertilized egg and fertilized egg are clearly different entities". Then what was the point you were making by bringing up the definition of an organism?
I think I agree with most of your first section. A couple points though:
>However, I am very certain that this conviction is not a scientific necessity.
Well personhood isn't a scientific concept. So science can't prove when personhood begins. It can only provide evidence about development that we can use to try to determine when personhood begins.
>If you accept that my nonhuman ancestors example disproves your axiom of non-partiality of personhood in the domain of philosphy/science
It doesn't 100% disprove it, because we don't 100% know what happened in the past.
>If you need to provide your kidneys for the duration of one week, then your sacrifice is clearly much less than that of a pregnant woman.
Well if I'm tied down by a tube, would I be able to walk around, drive a car, sleep, use the restroom, have a private conversation? A pregnant woman can do all those things. Yes, while in labor her activities are more restricted, but that doesn't last a week.
If the level of inconvenience of the tube was similar to the level of inconvenience of pregnancy, I would be in favor of the state making it illegal to disconnect the tube IF it's the only way to prevent an innocent person from dying. The state should however compensate the healthy person. I'm also in favor of the state providing compensation for pregnant women.
>So you must either claim that it's a different entity, or that not being fertilized doesn't count as a "problem".
The "or" in that sentence is inclusive or, right, not exclusive or? So it's ok for me to claim both, or just 1?
I claim that not being fertilized doesn't count as a problem. Most eggs don't get fertilized. The standard course of events for an egg is no fertilization.
I also think the unfertilized egg and fertilized egg are different entities. But due to the "or", I don't need to argue this point. For the sake of an argument we could say they're the same entity, and my overall point would still stand.
>Then what was the point you were making by bringing up the definition of an organism?
You said "You want to claim that the zygote is a person and the unfertilized egg is not, so of course the merger of DNA is the "clear" boundary between entities to you." I do think that's the clear boundary between entities, and I replied why. However, my overall definition is valid regardless of whether they're the same entity or different entities.
For the record, I remembered the rough Chomsky quote, and found a page[0] with the exact verbiage but no context. I went with my memory on the context.
You think too poorly of OP. I won't insult his intelligence by claiming he can't to a 5 second Google search before posting. He got the quote verbatim. Clearly he searched.
I frequently quote stuff from memory and it happens I quote wrong. Then I am not lying, but making a misstake. Most people do that in my experience. HN guidelines even say, assume good faith. You assume bad faith, that drags the entire conversation down .
Learning primarily through listening and talking only works if you have an enormous amount of high quality data, ie, the situation you're in as a baby when you're surrounded by native speakers who are producing speech for hours every day.
If you are an adult and want to spend, say, a couple of hours each week learning a language from scratch, especially without constant access to a native speaker, your initial progress will be much faster if you study grammar and vocabulary in a traditional class from a text book, than if you just try to pick up patterns from listening to the TV or something.
I can't source my claim. I attended a public lecture years ago from a researcher about exactly this misconception.
If the competition boils down to who has access to the largest amount of high quality data, it's hard to see how anyone but Google could win in the end: through Google Books they have scans of tens of millions of books, and published books are the highest quality texts there are.
I've been learning vietnamese. Unfortunately, a lot of social media (reddit, fb, etc) has a new generation of language. The younger generation uses so much abbreviations and acronyms, ChatGPT and Google Translate can't keep up.
I think if you're goal is to have properly written langauge using older writing styles, then you're correct.
I don't think it's simply a stylistic matter: it seems reasonable to assume that text in books tends to have higher information density, and contains longer and more complicated arguments (when compared to text obtained from social media posts, blogs, shorter articles, etc). If you want models that appear more intelligent, I think you need them to train on this kind of high-quality content.
The fact that these tend to be written in an older writing style is to me incidental. You could rewrite all your college text books in contemporary social media slang and I would still consider them high-quality texts.
Genuine question: is this something we know from evidence, or an assumption? I vaguely recall having read that comparison between skeletal remains of early farmers and hunter-gatherers indicated that the latter had a better diet, but I'm not sure if I'm remembering correctly or how much that observation generalizes.
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