> But I still think there is more going on. The subject in question is gender and gender identity. To begin with, even educated folks operating in good faith do not have a particularly coherent account of either.
I think there is a common, clear, useful model of both what descriptively exists and what the two main factions prefer normatively:
Given: that there exist actual physical differences between people, and
Given: that these differences are the basis for different descriptive labels on several orthogonal axes,
Given: that there are categories i to which people are assigned by society, and
Given: those categories are on a number of orthogonal axes, and
Given: that people have idea of which of those categories they should be assigned by society.
There is one of axes of physical trait based differentiation called “sex”.
There is one axis of social differentiation called “gender”, for which the corresponding self-understood correct category is “gender identity”.
The two major conflicting normative camps are: one that holds that sex determines correct socially ascribed gender (of which there are two possible categorizations of each) and correct gender identity (the same as correct ascribed gender), and one that holds that gender identity defines correct socially ascribed gender and that sex is largely beside the point (even if it statistically correlates with gender identity.)
Thank you for breaking it down. One objection I might raise in your "given" statements is that the categories we use are not all on equal footing. I think the modern idea of gender identity seems to require dualism—a deeply implausible position—but that's a much longer conversation.
Ultimately I agree that we are making decisions about language. I might break it down differently, as follows.
1. Language about how we identify differences should be useful and effective communicate public facts that are socially salient. Sex is public information and highly salient for courting and reproduction, the basis for most human societies' social organization and primary motivators of behavior.
2. Language about how we identify differences should be self-determined, not based on external facts about the world, and should primarily serve the dignity of the individual. An individual's gender is not society's business, unless they say it is.
If someone has a better formulation of 2, I'd be open. I admit it feels a bit strawman-ish.
I think there is a common, clear, useful model of both what descriptively exists and what the two main factions prefer normatively:
Given: that there exist actual physical differences between people, and
Given: that these differences are the basis for different descriptive labels on several orthogonal axes,
Given: that there are categories i to which people are assigned by society, and
Given: those categories are on a number of orthogonal axes, and
Given: that people have idea of which of those categories they should be assigned by society.
There is one of axes of physical trait based differentiation called “sex”.
There is one axis of social differentiation called “gender”, for which the corresponding self-understood correct category is “gender identity”.
The two major conflicting normative camps are: one that holds that sex determines correct socially ascribed gender (of which there are two possible categorizations of each) and correct gender identity (the same as correct ascribed gender), and one that holds that gender identity defines correct socially ascribed gender and that sex is largely beside the point (even if it statistically correlates with gender identity.)