I think all historians agree a US victory was almost certain, if not dead certain after Pearl Harbor. That attack didn’t destroy enough of the US fleet to buy the Japanese time to trie and get even with the USA in production capacity.
> In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.
Isoruku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Navy.
The problem with this line of thought is that it's basically ignores the historical exemplar that Japan used to justify their actions in the first place - the Sino-Ruso war. Russia was a juggernaut compared to Japan, but two catastrophic attacks - one surprised removed all support for the war from Japan, and the Czar gave in and ended the war.
Historians are arguing that in a industrialized conflict, where the United States was committed to war, Japan had no shot at winning. And to some degree that's true. But it depended on political factors that were no means set in stone.
But was America truly that dedicated to war with Japan? Turns out yes - but it's not hard to see a world where Japan wasn't quite a closely allied to Germany and/or Midway had gone the other way, or after millions where dead in the home island where that commitment would be tested.
Or conversely - as Hitler hoped - Japan would hold off America just long enough for the Russians to be finished off by the Germans in the East and Britain would finally come to the table. In a "Germany First" Strategy, America could not have taken the offensive in 1942 in that scenario.
But it's also reflective of the dehumanization that Japan's leadership as - the West was soft, just as the Russians were soft, and Japan's greater fighting spirit would carry the day.
Especially considering Midway was so close, even with the gigantic advantages the US Navy has ( intelligence so they basically knew what the Japanese were doing, in what order and where, and radars).
