First:
This was written after the war was over-- "justifying further fire-bombing" would be pretty ineffective at that point.
Also, to quote from the survey:
> We underestimated the ability of our air attack on Japan's home
islands, coupled as it was with blockade and previous military
defeats, to achieve unconditional surrender without invasion. By
July 1945, the weight of our air attack had as yet reached only a
fraction of its planned proportion, Japan's industrial potential had been fatally reduced, her civilian population had lost its confidence
in victory and was approaching the limit of its endurance, and her
leaders, convinced of the inevitability of defeat, were preparing to
accept surrender. The only remaining problem was the timing and
terms of that surrender.
This does NOT read like a justification for *more* fire-bombing to me, but rather like a "we bombed them much more than necessary before July already".
First: This was written after the war was over-- "justifying further fire-bombing" would be pretty ineffective at that point.
Also, to quote from the survey: > We underestimated the ability of our air attack on Japan's home islands, coupled as it was with blockade and previous military defeats, to achieve unconditional surrender without invasion. By July 1945, the weight of our air attack had as yet reached only a fraction of its planned proportion, Japan's industrial potential had been fatally reduced, her civilian population had lost its confidence in victory and was approaching the limit of its endurance, and her leaders, convinced of the inevitability of defeat, were preparing to accept surrender. The only remaining problem was the timing and terms of that surrender.
This does NOT read like a justification for *more* fire-bombing to me, but rather like a "we bombed them much more than necessary before July already".