A lot of criticism of the atomic bombing is context free 20-20 hindsight.
Big armies are like huge complex ships: they take a while to get moving, are hard to steer and hard to stop. So one can criticize the destruction of Dresden, but you also have to remember that the UK had built a machine that threw planes into the air and there was little correlation between the amount of armaments being sent and the number of targets available (or accounting to reduced opposition). Yet that machine was a small part of a huge effort, and was probably only paid attention to by the high command when something went wrong. And not to mention the rage and anger on the part of a bunch of people who had been bombed themselves for years.
My wife grew up near a town in Germany that was bombed for the first time, and utterly flattened, in late April 1945. Absolutely no strategic value; they had simply wiped out everything above it on the list so now it was their turn. I never heard anyone complain about it (and boy old people were happy to give you an earful about all sorts of things).
For more lack of retrospective context: As for the atomic bomb, don't forget Turman only heard about it when he became president. And all sorts of facts that seem clear today were completely unclear back then. What would the soviets actually do? Was Okinawa an example of what the invasion would be like? Japan still occupied Manchuria and other parts of Asia. Intelligence on the risks the Allies faced was still thin.
And don't forget that allied troops in Europe were rebelling (even turning their arms against their officers) at the prospect of being shipped to the pacific theatre.
Was there industry in or near the town that supported the German war effort? Were there German military units stationed in or near the town? I'm not saying it's right but the term "strategic value" had a very different definition in WWII. Any and all war effort or suspected war effort had "strategic value".
> And don't forget that allied troops in Europe were rebelling (even turning their arms against their officers) at the prospect of being shipped to the pacific theatre.
I've never heard of this- was this really a widespread occurrence?
>> And don't forget that allied troops in Europe were rebelling (even turning their arms against their officers) at the prospect of being shipped to the pacific theatre.
> I've never heard of this- was this really a widespread occurrence?
I also never heard of widespread armed rebellion but definitely there was a lot of animosity over who got to go home, who got to stay, and who had to go to the Pacific. I would not have wanted that job.
Big armies are like huge complex ships: they take a while to get moving, are hard to steer and hard to stop. So one can criticize the destruction of Dresden, but you also have to remember that the UK had built a machine that threw planes into the air and there was little correlation between the amount of armaments being sent and the number of targets available (or accounting to reduced opposition). Yet that machine was a small part of a huge effort, and was probably only paid attention to by the high command when something went wrong. And not to mention the rage and anger on the part of a bunch of people who had been bombed themselves for years.
My wife grew up near a town in Germany that was bombed for the first time, and utterly flattened, in late April 1945. Absolutely no strategic value; they had simply wiped out everything above it on the list so now it was their turn. I never heard anyone complain about it (and boy old people were happy to give you an earful about all sorts of things).
For more lack of retrospective context: As for the atomic bomb, don't forget Turman only heard about it when he became president. And all sorts of facts that seem clear today were completely unclear back then. What would the soviets actually do? Was Okinawa an example of what the invasion would be like? Japan still occupied Manchuria and other parts of Asia. Intelligence on the risks the Allies faced was still thin.
And don't forget that allied troops in Europe were rebelling (even turning their arms against their officers) at the prospect of being shipped to the pacific theatre.