In 1942 the leaders of the US, UK, France, and Russia had agreed that unconditional surrender was the only acceptable end to the war - for a variety of reasons including partly that no ally would negotiate surrender terms separately from the rest. The Allies held true to that for Germany and Italy. In Japan, even after two atomic bombings, Japan was still trying to negotiate terms. Ultimately we did break from that by agreeing informally (not in writing) to one of their terms - not to execute the emperor - and with that Japan finally agreed to surrender.
Even so, a military group attempted a coup to stop the surrender the night before - after the emperor's surrender message had been recorded but before it was broadcast.
After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender.
> After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender.
The Japanese themselves knew that they could not win the war in 1944:
> Rear Adm. Soichi Takagi, who was attached to the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943 and February 1944, of the war's battle lesson up to that time. He conclude that Japan could not win and verbally presented his findings in March 1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm. Seibi Inouye. Takagi's study, interestingly enough, was undertaken at the end of the second year of the war--the time beyond which, the Japanese Navy's top command had estimated before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful war. Takagi's estimate was based on an analysis of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses suffered to date, the serious difficulties in acquiring essential imported materials, the internal confusion in Japan, and a growing feeling among the "intelligentsia" that Tojo should be let out. It seemed clear to Takagi that potential long-range air attacks on the home islands and Japan's inability to import essential materials for production had created a situation which dictated that Japan should seek a compromise peace. In Takagi's view Japan at this time should have envisaged withdrawing from China and giving up both Korea and Formosa as part of the peace terms. His study in any case documented the fears Yonai and others held before the war and lent support to the increasing but still carefully guarded concern of their fellow Jushin that all was not well with Tojo's prosecution of the war.
Even so, a military group attempted a coup to stop the surrender the night before - after the emperor's surrender message had been recorded but before it was broadcast.
After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender.