They got to play with 10x leverage with their client funds for free. You can't barely get 2x leverage at broker, you pay interest rates much higher and they actually enforce strict margins.
Minewhile these people out of their privilege as bankers got to play with much bigger leverage, while paying zero interest rates to their counterparty which turned out to be fully paid for by the government in the end.
100% investment loss in this case is hardly enough, with the leverage levels banks can access they can literally collect pennies in front of a train and have positive expectation values for shareholders, while investing in negative expectation value investments.
And they did collect pennies in front of a train. Bought 10yr treasuries at historical lows. They paid their customers nothing for it.
VC investment strategy for VC bank. They took the zero or hero attitude until the end. Again, we're taking about people with already VC mentality of "worst case 100% loss, best case 1000%".
No wonder that once VCs recognized their own shadow they fled so fast.
And now they are pretending as if it's the fate of the banking system on the line.
VC bank, managed like VC venture for VC firms. They deserve to lose VC money.
Their loans are probably also worthless than they claim, but they managed to successfully swindle the Fed in the most VC way ever with the shortest deadline. I'm betting FDIC is going to pay twice as much as expected in the end.
> And they did collect pennies in front of a train. Bought 10yr treasuries at historical lows.
> worst case 100% loss, best case 1000%
See I don't understand how you can have 1000% return by buying treasuries, at any time. It was a stupid decision in hind sight, but the best case is order of magnitudes below 1000% return.
And you've put these two things right next to each other, what am I missing?
They would be perfectly safe have they dumped their deposits into T-Bills.
They didn't went for the 1000%, they went for the 5-10% extra and ended up losing everything.
Had they used T-Bills or even straight up depositing it against the Federal Reserve for NO return, they would remain liquid and could now reinvest into higher yield bonds as the rates have risen. Instead they now hold 1.5% 10 year HTM bonds that are now valued at 70% original today because the prevailing rate is 4.5%.
To clarify I don't know the actual strategy they took. I am responding to how they can have risk in "make safe loans" or "buy safe bonds" scenario.
> They would be perfectly safe have they dumped their deposits into T-Bills.
How is this different than what you described? If the rate increases beyond the coupon of a 10 year treasury, its value drops. Are you referring to extremely short term treasuries?
Thanks for explaining it so well. I was thinking that simply losing the bank was enough in this case, but you make a very good point, and this kind of insight is what's good about this site.
You seem to be conflating the bankers with the bank owners here. The former have done well, the latter have lost everything (total SVB dividends are less than the value of the bank).
Do you really think the owners and senior management of SVB ended up with nothing? What about the stock sales they made right before the FDIC took over, or the bonuses given out, or even their compensation during the years in which this high-risk interest rate scheme was going on?
They have orders of magnitude more money than most people, and will get away with no liability.
> What about the stock sales they made right before the FDIC took over
Is there a more clear cut case of insider trading? SEC should already been working on that now.
Anyhow, you're arguing that they SHOULD end up with nothing, that is an entirely different subject of its own. Because you're talking about punishment, while I'm talking about deterrence.
Punishment must be enacted from outside after the fact, while deterrence can be innate before it happens. These senior management could have years of cushy job and more equity, and now they have to rely on savings and have the SEC up their ass. It's clear which is more preferable.
Just wondering, if they know for sure that they will be sued afterwards, why would they sale their stocks? Why not do nothing and live with what they already have? Is there a possibility that they can get away with it?
> Is there a more clear cut case of insider trading?
Genuine question, is there any evidence that these trades were out of the norm, rather than a regular portfolio rebalancing that’s common with any employee who receives part of their comp in RSUs?
Honestly I'd like for there to be a decent look-back period to recover the funds from any stock sold ahead of time, as appears to have happened in this instance. Use the proceeds to help make depositors whole.
No proof at the moment, but from what I've read several of the executives conveniently sold a lot of their stock more or less at the same time right before this kicked off. Guarantee at least some of that was some insider golden-parachuting.
I would guess that these executives entered their sales months in advance as is relatively typical to avoid insider trading. You can look this up on the SEC website
And in the case of company failure, perhaps the lookback period should be extended beyond several months. I don't have nearly the financial or legal knowledge to suggest viable policy, but from what we know of how SVB failed it would have likely been visible well in advance of the failure to someone with access to the requisite information.
I don't know why people keep calling out the CEO stock sales, unless we find out something new this was almost guaranteed to have been done pursuant to a publicly filed 10b5-1 plan which has a 30 or 90 day cooling off period and must be filed when they have no material non-public information. So if the CEO could see this coming, anyone else could have too on the basis of the same information.
These things can come at you fast. They probably put in the trade instructions sometime last year and they are not permitted to make modifications to the 10b5-1 when they do come into material non-public information as that is itself insider trading.
Trading (or changing a 10b5-1 plan) while in possession of material non-public information, whether in your favor or not, is insider trading.
I don’t know if your are just ignorant or if your are intentionally misleading people but this system is widely abused. A stock sale can be schedule in your plan at the end of every month and you can elect to cancel a planned sale at any time. The CEO used exactly this type of sham plan to unload his shares. Look at the plan he filed this year and the plan he filed every year for the last three years.
> A stock sale can be schedule in your plan at the end of every month and you can elect to cancel a planned sale at any time.
Canceling a 10b5-1 is not in and of itself a violation, correct, but it can kill your affirmative defense as it jeopardizes the good faith element.
However, they would have had to have entered into the 10b5-1 prior to them coming into material nonpublic information in the first place for it to have been valid at all. My point is they made the decision to sell before they knew what was happening and filed a compliant trading plan.
> I think that's a good enough deterrence against bad things.
Nah. They should liquidate the owner's private property as well to cover uninsured depositor losses. Better than making them whole by printing money and having everyone else pay for it indirectly through inflation.
All owners of the bank will end up with nothing, I think that's a good enough deterrence against bad things.