It did not require lightning reflexes or up-to-the-second training. The first LA crash came after the crew dealt with it for 11 minutes, and restored trim 25 times. The EA crew restored normal trim a couple times, and crashed after 3 minutes if I recall correctly.
As for training, turning off the stab trim system to stop runaway trim is a "memory item", which means the pilots must know it without needing to consult a checklist. Additionally, after the first crash, all MAX crews received an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE with a two-step procedure:
1. restore normal trim with the electric trim switches
2. turn off the trim system
I expect a MAX pilot to read, understand, and remember an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, especially as it contains instructions on how not to crash like the previous crew. Don't you?
> might have been able to save the aircraft
It's a certainty. Remember the first LA MAX incident, the airplane did not crash because after restoring normal trim a couple times, the crew turned off the trim system, and continued the flight normally. They apparently didn't even think it was a big deal, as the aircraft was handed over to the next crew, who crashed.
> a bit of extra training
They are already required to know all "memory items".
> Coming up with this narrative about how it's the crew's fault because they failed to disable Boeing's quietly introduced little self-destruct system fast enough to save their own lives was a particularly despicable move from their PR department
AFAIK Boeing never did say it was the crew's fault. The "have to respond within 5 seconds" is a fantasy invented by the media. It is not factual.
Both Boeing and the crews share responsibility for the crashes.
> Both Boeing and the crews share responsibility for the crashes.
And I never said they didn't. I just choose to assign Boeing the lion's share of the blame, as they should never have let that rush-job, cost-cutting death trap of a machine take to the skies in the first place.
Anyway, I see you have your mind made up, so there's not much point in arguing further. If you feel like continuing, why don't you take it up with - let's see - every single global aviation regulator, who also somehow came to the conclusion that there was maybe something a little bit wrong with the type.
As for training, turning off the stab trim system to stop runaway trim is a "memory item", which means the pilots must know it without needing to consult a checklist. Additionally, after the first crash, all MAX crews received an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE with a two-step procedure:
1. restore normal trim with the electric trim switches
2. turn off the trim system
I expect a MAX pilot to read, understand, and remember an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, especially as it contains instructions on how not to crash like the previous crew. Don't you?
> might have been able to save the aircraft
It's a certainty. Remember the first LA MAX incident, the airplane did not crash because after restoring normal trim a couple times, the crew turned off the trim system, and continued the flight normally. They apparently didn't even think it was a big deal, as the aircraft was handed over to the next crew, who crashed.
> a bit of extra training
They are already required to know all "memory items".
> Coming up with this narrative about how it's the crew's fault because they failed to disable Boeing's quietly introduced little self-destruct system fast enough to save their own lives was a particularly despicable move from their PR department
AFAIK Boeing never did say it was the crew's fault. The "have to respond within 5 seconds" is a fantasy invented by the media. It is not factual.
Both Boeing and the crews share responsibility for the crashes.