It's a little odd to see discussions of Hamas centering on the 2017 charter. That document was written by Khaled Mishal, who led the Hamas political wing (the "politburo", I guess?) from Doha. It was announced just as Mishal was forced from power by the hardline Gaza-based Al-Qassam wing of Hamas, which rejects that charter.
People go back and forth on how much evidence there is or isn't for Sinwar and Gaza-based Hamas's rejection of the 2017 charter, but read reporting and analysis from the time, untainted by what happened on October 7, about what the objectives were for updating the charter (significantly: easing Egypt's longstanding blocade of Gaza, repairing political relationships, working around Egypt's post-Arab-Spring, post-Sisi coup suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's parent organization). Then look what happened on October 7. Like, there isn't much doubt that the 2017 document was unserious at this point?
This is purely a nerd point and not something I expect would change anybody's mind about what's happening in Gaza or what the outcomes should be.
The Charter was at the time meant seriously, at least by a certain faction within Hamas.
But with intervening events -- such as the appallingly harsh response to the 2018-2019 border protests; the storming of Al-Aqsa; and the election of the 37th Government (which brought on board not just an unsavory cast of characters, but specific plans for the continued expansion of the Settlements) -- the view took hold that Israeli society was plainly not interested in such overtures.
So as a result, the Charter got flagged and downvoted.
OK, but the reporting at the time of the charter was that Mishal had lost a power struggle with the hardliners --- these are events that occurred before the 2018 "protest". People wrote about the new charter when it happened! There's a bunch of analysis you can go read. You don't need to axiomatically derive this stuff, including the notion that the Al-Qassam wing rejected the 2017 charter.
Acknowledged that there were additional factors and events involved.
Since you prefer not to be centered on the Charter itself: if we are to understand why the decision was made to launch Operation Al-Aqsa Flood; an in particular how they were able to recruit so many people to agree to what was apparently promised as a suicide mission -- then I submit that is necessary to consider the whole background of events up until that time.
The 2018 "protest"
Can we just acknowledge the cruel and unduly harsh nature of the military response to the protests (which by all accounts did at least start peacefully, and from within sectors of society independent of Hamas) without having to allude to the Israeli government's snide, mocking ("fake protest") narrative of it?
As if these people have nothing to protest or be unhappy about.
Anyways: one such report, about the conference, is via MEMRI. MEMRI is itself not really all that trustworthy! I would steer away from any analytical results! But this piece is largely direct quotes. Maybe they're fabricating them. Seems a little unlikely, though?
Notably, a bunch of more mainstream sources corroborated this report (just Google for the name of the conference). I think it's very likely to be legitimate.
People go back and forth on how much evidence there is or isn't for Sinwar and Gaza-based Hamas's rejection of the 2017 charter, but read reporting and analysis from the time, untainted by what happened on October 7, about what the objectives were for updating the charter (significantly: easing Egypt's longstanding blocade of Gaza, repairing political relationships, working around Egypt's post-Arab-Spring, post-Sisi coup suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's parent organization). Then look what happened on October 7. Like, there isn't much doubt that the 2017 document was unserious at this point?
This is purely a nerd point and not something I expect would change anybody's mind about what's happening in Gaza or what the outcomes should be.