"It blows my mind that a kernel driver with the level of proliferation in industry could make it out the door apparently without even the most basic level of qualification."
It was my understanding that MS now sign 3rd party kernel mode code, with quality requirements. In which case why did they fail to prevent this?
Drivers have had to be signed forever and pass pretty rigorous test suites and static analysis.
The problem here is obviously this other file the driver sucks in. Just because the driver didn't crash for Microsoft in their lab doesn't mean a different file can't crash it...
How so? Preventing roll-backs on software updates is a "security feature" in most cases for better and for worse. Yeah, it would be convenient for tinkerers or in rare events such as these, but would be a security issue in the 99,9..99% of the time for enterprise users where security is the main concern.
I don't really understand this, many Linux distributions like Universal Blue advertise rollbacks as a feature. How is preventing a roll-back a "security feature"?
Imagine a driver has an exploitable vulnerability that is fixed in an update. If an attacker can force a rollback to the vulnerable older version, then the system is still vulnerable. Disallowing the rollback fixes this.
It was my understanding that MS now sign 3rd party kernel mode code, with quality requirements. In which case why did they fail to prevent this?