> that this whole 'punishment' is contingent on something so seemingly minor as UN membership (a.k.a. state recognition?)
If the battle lines are on recognition, that's where the fight will be. Once a country is broadly recognised, it's a moot point. (We don't recognise the governments in Tehran, Havana and Caracas, for example.)
> People hate Iran and North Korea, but I don't think many are arguing for them to be expelled from the UN outright
The best analogy is Beijing vis-à-vis Taiwan. Not only does Beijing not recognise Taipei, it also punishes countries and multi-lateral organisations who do.
In this was recognition is analogised to secondary sanctions, and it's something that's been done since the dawn of civilisation.
In the context of the US, is recognizing a government different from recognizing a country? Is a refusal to deal with Taliban functionally equivalent to not recognizing Afghanistan at all?
> The best analogy is Beijing vis-à-vis Taiwan. Not only does Beijing not recognise Taipei, it also punishes countries and multi-lateral organisations who do.
This is a close analogy, but the important distinction here is that the PRC is the claimant to the ROC, so they have a straightforward and very strong motivation to thwart their recognition at all costs, as to avoid delegitimizing their own claims on it. The US, on the other hand, is a complete third party to either Israel or Palestine. They have interests and goals in the area, but nothing nearly as extreme as China's situation. That's what makes this situation so unique to me, it seems so disproportional of a reaction for a country that's not a party in the war. It makes sense if Israel does it, but the US?
> In the context of the US, is recognizing a government different from recognizing a country?
In the context of anyone, it depends on what changed. The Iranian Revolution changed Iran's government but not borders or existence. Kosovo, on the other hand, created both a new government and a new state.
> the important distinction here is that the PRC is the claimant to the ROC, so they have a straightforward and very strong motivation to thwart their recognition at all costs, as to avoid delegitimizing their own claims on it. The US, on the other hand, is a complete third party to either Israel or Palestine
Direct versus indirect. Go back to the Cold War (or perhaps more accurately, decolonisation) and the USSR and U.S. were doing this by proxy, too. (And everyone was doing it, almost out of necessity, during the world wars.)
My point is this sort of posturing is deeply precedented when geopolitical maps change because the loser has nothing to lose and something to gain from holding off recognition of whatever just changed. (Even if that gain is just not having to deal with it right now.)
If you want a more-direct example, it would be Pakistan supporting Beijing over its claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Pakistan does this because India is its enemy and China its ally. In the Middle East, Iran is America's enemy and Israel its ally. What the people in Arunachal Pradesh or Palestine think about the matter sort of gets swept under the rug. (Or Beijing giving lip service or North Korea and Iran arms to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine, if you want to rule out the size influence factor.)
If the battle lines are on recognition, that's where the fight will be. Once a country is broadly recognised, it's a moot point. (We don't recognise the governments in Tehran, Havana and Caracas, for example.)
> People hate Iran and North Korea, but I don't think many are arguing for them to be expelled from the UN outright
The best analogy is Beijing vis-à-vis Taiwan. Not only does Beijing not recognise Taipei, it also punishes countries and multi-lateral organisations who do.
In this was recognition is analogised to secondary sanctions, and it's something that's been done since the dawn of civilisation.