Gar Alperovitz wrote the definitive book on the subject "The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb".
Many US military experts and top generals believed it was unnecessary. Japan was defeated, particularly with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, it was over for them.
> Many US military experts and top generals believed it was unnecessary. Japan was defeated, particularly with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, it was over for them.
Yes, Japan was defeated a year before the bombs were dropped. The problem was Japan decided not to surrender even though themselves they knew they lost.
That's the problem.
Japan not surrendering even when they knew.
Per Japanese documents even after one bomb was dropped they still would not surrender. It took the second bomb, and even then the war cabinet was split on 3-3 on whether to surrender.
Two bombs dropping only got them to the point of a tie. The Emperor had to be called in to break the tie after two bombings.
And the Japanese knew the Soviets were going to enter the war. That was already in their calculations and they still were for fighting.
But you do realize that in cabinet meetings after the atomic bombings, the bombings themselves were only scarcely discussed? It is unknown how much impact the atomic bomb had on their decision to surrender, but it is certainly only one of many factors.
> Gar Alperovitz wrote the definitive book on the subject "The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb".
"definitive"? What does that even mean in a field of study like history? You're telling me there has been zero new analysis on the subject since 1995? No new insights?
And even that assumes that Alperovitz's initial premises were valid, that he did not miss any evidence,or exclude or discount any because his own biases and such, and so that is conclusions followed logically from all of that.
There is nothing comparable to this particular book or study, that I know of. The entire book is dedicated to that question, and investigates all the key players and decision makers deeply.
fair enough to notice though that while the Soviet Union may have had agreed to enter the war with Japan (at the Potsdam conference ?), it had not done so by the time the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima was dropped. It did declare war on Japan the day before the Nagasaki bombing. In a way ... Stalin chose the "let's go to war with Japan" date opportunistically. When it was clear there could be much gain without too much pain.
Which is not a dissimilar thing to the US "wavering" over the commitment to an invasion of Japan. The nuclear bombs "resolved" that. We'll never know what would have happened otherwise.
Many US military experts and top generals believed it was unnecessary. Japan was defeated, particularly with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, it was over for them.