The Gripen is a good choice for geographically small countries.
It's able to operate from airstrips that are no more than roads, with modest mobile ground equipment for support. Saab commercial for the Gripen: [1]
The USAF's force model involves basing at big, well-equipped, well-protected air bases. Those are now hard to protect from drone attacks, as Russia recently found out. From now on, air forces have to be able to operate from improvised bases, or build very strong bunkers at major bases.
"It's able to operate from airstrips that are no more than roads, with modest mobile ground equipment for support."
Nothing is really new. I used to live in West Germany in the '70s and '80s. The UK had an aircraft called Harrier - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrier_jump_jet. At that time I think Sweden was deploying the Drakken (Dragon) and later the Vigen (Lightning). I made models of both as a child and I think both of them were superb in their own way.
Harrier was designed to work out of fields, let alone roads. Rather similar to an Apache. Minimal maint (ish) and so on.
I now live in Yeovil, Somerset and we have recently had several Italian rotary wing aircraft, such as The Seaking doing test flights around here. Presumably airframe testing and proving for VJ Day.
Not sure if ever made a lot of sense to land harrier in an unprepared location though. Lots of risk of foreign object damage to the engines. And logistically more difficult for refueling/rearming. Much better to use it on short but prepared strips.
The Swedish idea is to pre-build wider stretches of highway around the country, and then later use those as needed. Not fields, but not 100% clear of debris either.
The USMC is set up to do that. There are seven Wasp-class amphibious assault ships. Each is a Marine ground-air task force in a can.[1] The concept is that the ships stand offshore and launch VTOL aircraft (F-35s and Harriers) from the top, and landing craft from the well deck.
This works great unless the onshore enemy has anti-ship missiles and drones.[2] Unlike fleet carriers, which can stand off from an enemy shore, amphibious assault ships have to operate in sight of shore, maybe a few kilometers, because their job is to launch boats. That's within small drone range.
The assault ships can be much farther offshore for air operations. The flight deck isn’t just for STOVL jets, it can also handle lots of helicopter and tiltrotor traffic, which is also used for ship-to-shore movement.
Also, anti ship missiles and drones aren’t a cheat code. They can be suppressed, jammed, destroyed with preparatory fires, or shot down in flight. Anti-ship missiles aren’t new, nor are anti-anti-ship-missile-missiles. Anti-ship missiles were a major factor in the 1982 Falklands War but not, in the end, a decisive one.
I remember the Jaguar - a very square aircraft in cross section (as I think of it) and it was a French/British collaboration.
It (Jag) wasn't really about mixing it in the hand to hand combat thing - it was a trainer and a few other things. I remember the landing gear being really long but not robust.
Which RAF bases are around there? I used to live at the end of the Filton airstrip and I came home one day to a Harrier hovering directly over my house. It moved off towards Filton, but I didn't see where it went. I didn't think about what RAF bases are in the West Country.
> It's able to operate from airstrips that are no more than roads, with modest mobile ground equipment for support.
This is an oft quoted gimmick. Most planes can take off just fine from a normal paved road. As a rule of thumb, if the road can supported a heavy container truck, it can support an aircraft of equivalent weight. (Transportation class and airliners are a different story entirely as they are extremely heavy).
A good runway is one that's without debris. The only other factor that makes a plane good for taking off on different surfaces is the location and design of the engine intake. You want to avoid rocks being sucked into the engine.
But generally speaking, if you have a nice clean paved road that can support heavy usage by semis trucks, most random fighter jets can take off from it just fine.
There’s another approach, which the US is very experienced with: have your airbase far away from the enemy, perhaps in Missouri, and do a lot of in-air refueling.
Ukraine has been successful attacking Russian airbases with drones because they can sneak entire truckloads of drones and drone pilots into Russian-controlled territory. And even that was a massive operation that took over a year to plan. Israel carried out similar drone operations against Iran, so we know it’s not a fluke and this approach can be effective, but it’s harder to pull off the longer the distances become.
The F-35 has a STOVL model if that's somehow relevant, which is superior to the Gripen in both stealth and ability to operate from improvised bases
While Ukraine was able to use drones to attack Russian airbases, this was not the way Israel overpowered Iran, whose main driving factor was F-35s rather than drones (although these were present)
Only the F-35B, and it has to sacrifice performance in speed and maneuverability to get there. The Gripen still boasts a number of advantages (and higher G-loading) if you aren't penetrating hostile airspace.
Any VTOL/STOVL jet has to trade off other performance qualities for VTOL/STOVL capability. Likewise, the Gripen still needs a longer runway, which limits the use of “improvised” airfields.
In practice the main benefit of STOVL has been in naval aviation. CATOBAR carriers are expensive and challenging to build, especially if you don’t have the economy of scale of building a dozen of the same class instead of just the 1-2 most countries can actually afford. A STOVL jet can also operate from an amphibious assault ship. The feasibility of the “improvised airfield” concept with modern jets is unproven and controversial, while STOVL naval aviation has been successfully done for decades.
Yes? The most common justification for having any air force at all is the interceptor role. Dozens of nations have legitimate, blooded air forces that exclusively serve the interception/CAP mission profile. Many are near-peer threat actors if things go wrong.
That air force is going to face attrition the enemy does not and be unable to support operations that break into the enemy rear. I'd rather fight on their land than mine.
> It's able to operate from airstrips that are no more than roads
I can understand this argument.
> The USAF's force model involves basing at big, well-equipped, well-protected air bases.
But I don't understand this one. Isn't a drone attack a drone attack? The same drones that could take out F-16s could take out Gripens. You'd have to defend your expensive weapon systems in either case.
Don't we need a new strategy that isn't entirely reliant upon extremely powerful, but extremely expensive hardware? I'd imagine you still want your expensive pieces, but that you want a compliment of inexpensive combat items and fortified bunkers as a line of defense to protect them when not deployed.
> The same drones that could take out F-16s could take out Gripens
Gripens could base on ordinary highway, so could distribute planes through big territory.
Drones usually have limited range, so they really could target most air bases capable for F-16 (using for example semi-truck container as movable nest), but it is literally impossible now, to target all highways.
Yes but it's a question of finding targets. Why was Ukraine able to decimate the Russian Air Force? Partly because they are all based out of big, well known bases. Even in wartime they have to be in a big base.
A jet like the Gripen can move basically instantly to basically anywhere and then it's hard to find, especially because it can just move again
True, but the Gripen is not a big strategic bomber and Sweden doesn't have nukes to threaten other countries with. They do air policing and would employ guerilla tactics in case of war, like put a gripen in a cattle shed somewhere and operate it from a road¹. It's a good strategy for a smaller country with lower population density to defend itself. Possibly not such a great option for Benelux, but for most of the EU, save for the big boys it's great. Even Germany could employ it, with the amount of sheds and the highway network that they have. Russia and the US needs aibases to operate strategic bombers from.
They hit a substantial fraction of the Russian long range bombers and assorted other aircraft. Quite a bit of that is at least for the moment impossible for Russia to replace.
I admit I didn't read the article. Is the Gripen 40% cheaper so that countries can own more of them?
Also smaller airbases can mean more airbases. So a single drone attack might take out one or two bases worth of Gripen. But it takes a lot more drones and a lot more sophisticated attack to take out all the Gripen spread across so many small bases.
Gripen is more expensive to purchase than the F-35 and F-16. The operating costs are a bit cheaper than the F-16 and substantially cheaper than the F-35 however.
The on paper assumption / sales pitch that remains valid in most scenarios is increased survivability of shooters = more sorties. If hardware can operate from austere conditions you can squeeze in a few more missions, which may be tactically/operationally significant, but there's limitations on modern airframes, still need to go back to a well resourced large base (5th gen also requires conditioned shelters) for maintenance, i.e. it's still fundamentally a bandaid solution. The logistics tail is also larger <- this gets slept on (or underplayed in public facing messaging).
It remains valid in most scenarios, as in most force on force that is not US/PRC, because very few countries has c4isr abilities to kill chain entire operational theatre, i.e. it's partially hopium strategy in US vs PRC in IndoPac. Which circles back to your second point, the related debate around hardening and distributing is almost distraction - airforce capitalization of highend platforms is in the shitters - so there's parallel discussion around distributed / agile deployment but with cheaper CCAs. Of course what's typically being hand waved away is the logistics tail part, i.e. there's already massive maintenance personnel shortages, unlikely to disperse thousands of maintenance crews on the ground to support the concept. The even more handwaved part for US in IndoPac is host nation access / political constraints.
There's a reason US wants JP to support ACE/agile combat employment (as in on main islands), increase harden shelters... but JP reluctant to open main islands. Because no one wants more American forces doing shenanigans with their civilians and the optics of having support fleets reminding populace they're on the frontline is bad. Hence JP still largely constraining US to Okinawa/Ryukyus, PH in Luzon/Palawan. The further downstream handwaving of all this is even if properly implemented, is now you've spread out shit load of more exposed logistics staff across vulnerable islands, i.e. dramatically increased exfiltration complexity / suicide deployments. Survivability of drones increases, survivability of the logistics force decreases. Which is... even worse optics, hence it's rarely even part of discussion with respect to ACE. There some self awareness with marine NMESIS MLRS / EABO (expeditionary advanced base operations)... i.e. wait we're sending marines on likely one way missions to tiny islands that PRC can lock down? Maybe that's worth if they take out a type055.
How do improvised bases offer protection, especially in a world where radar on satellites sees through clouds and certain vegetation?
USAF's switch to improvised bases seems to be motivated by needing to operate from small islands in the Pacific where they isn't enough solid ground to build a full airbase.
> How do improvised bases offer protection, especially in a world where radar on satellites sees through clouds and certain vegetation?
If operating from an airfield that has been improvised out of a straight stretch of highway, the grouping of vehicles that contain all of the necessary ground support equipment and munitions resupply can be disguised to resemble an ordinary civilian cargo box truck, or tractor trailer combo.
Unless the attacking force is willing to begin with the resources needed, and repercussions of airstriking everything that looks like a civilian cargo truck moving in the region, it would be extremely difficult to eliminate the group of vehicle and men that compromise the ground support equipment element. Particularly when you might have multiple groups of such roaming randomly around an area.
The Swedish airforce doesn't have a "grouping of vehicles".
They are all parked individually at separate locations kilometers away from the road landing strip.
When the plane comes in for landing, they (3-5 pickup trucks and a tiny tanker) all scramble and meet up when the plane touches down. Refuel and rearm in 10 minutes, drive away again.
I've seen this done with my own eyes, it's very impressive.
In terms of military resources required, there's a vast difference between keeping a close eye on the other side's few known airfields, and keeping a close eye on every park, parking lot, farm field, forest clearing, etc., etc. in their country.
The very successful attack that Ukraine performed on Russian long range bombers would have never worked if those weren't tied to particular locations for a really long time. 6 months of planning and execution would have gone out of the window by a single late (as in the last 30 days) order to move things around. All airfields are now at risk of such attacks, including civilian ones.
I would bet that within a year we'll see ransom attacks on airfields in open societies. The idea is out there and the capabilities are so cheap that any idiot could do it.
The schedules, radar frequencies, etc. of those commercial satellites are all public knowledge.
(Based on timestamps) your reference is to user cutemonster's comment. Yep - "move immediately after the satellite passes" is a game that children can master. I would put a bit more weight on user walrus01's (later) sibling comment - on the problem of distinguishing small, pop-up air bases from routine civilian activities.
Also, I suspect that very few of those commercial satellite radars have much resilience in the face of jamming. That is expensive and security-sensitive tech on the satellite operator's end, of minimal use to most users of the satellites' services. Vs. in a war zone, the diplomatic consequences of using cheap (relative to getting hit) ECM against surveillance satellites will usually be the lesser evil.
You can land it on any road and hide it under trees etc. Is it perfect? No, but probably hell lot harder to spot it in a random forest on a random road on the countryside than finding one of a few airports
While sweden has a lot of straight road stretches specifically designed to serve as emergency airfields, it is a lot easier to find 500 m of suitable road than 1600.
Yes, there's already Ukrainian fpv flown quadcopters which are optimized to intercept, as a munition, common flying wing camera surveillance platforms. I've seen probably 20 or 30 different videos now taken from the view of the quadcopter, with detonator contact wires sticking out the front, diving into the rear of a large Russian flying wing UAV.
- Anti-air weapons all based on maneuverability much exceed planes with human pilots.
- Anti-missile maneuver based on limited energy in missile, because it is usually ~100 times smaller then plane, and square-cube rule mean, missile could make active flight just few seconds - if plane survive these seconds it win.
Stealth planes are new tier in warfare, because enemy see them when already lost time need to launch anti-air weapons.
There have been thousands of such instances by now. Ramming is indeed the most frequently used option. Depending on the target drone there are different defender drones in use. Some favor altitude and duration of flight, others favor speed. It all depends on what you are trying to hit, what sensor package and what kind of flight conditions you will face (day/night for instance).
A better metric is likely how far out you want/need to project power rather than country size. The answer for that is very different depending on whether you're sweden or the usa
The USAF's force model involves basing at big, well-equipped, well-protected air bases. Those are now hard to protect from drone attacks, as Russia recently found out. From now on, air forces have to be able to operate from improvised bases, or build very strong bunkers at major bases.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QyD0liioY8E