They'd have to physically steal gold from people, and people would notice that. Or they could mine more gold, but that's hard. Or they could publicly and officially change the exchange rate (of dollars to gold), and people would notice that politicians make it go down, the same way that people notice when politicians make taxes go up (they notice way more than when prices other than taxes go up).
With the current system, they (the central bank) can just increase some people's numbers in some spreadsheets, and the effects are extremely indirect. Nominally this is in exchange for assets of equal value so the situation returns the normal after some time, but that hasn't been happening - the amount of money created this way has not been decreasing at any meaningful rate.
> And it would be impossible to bail out those bonds when they defaulted
Well the US hasn't defaulted so changing how a default works wouldn't really affect the trajectory we took. And a default would be pretty catastrophic either way.
Well the US isn't on the gold standard. If it was on the gold standard then it would have defaulted. That's why it moved off the gold standard.
Actually, by moving off the gold standard, it defaulted on dollars (at the time a kind of gold bond) rather than defaulting on dollar-denominated government bonds.
Nixon didn't abandon gold because economists suddenly discovered some brilliant new theory. He did it because the math had already sentenced the system to death. By August '71, Fort Knox was down to its last $11 billion in gold while foreign governments held at least $33 billion in paper dollars screaming for redemption. That's not a liquidity problem. That's a corpse with rigor mortis. And that's just the official tally; the real killer was the eurodollar market, that offshore shadow banking system nobody wanted to talk about, where another $50-70 billion in unredeemable IOUs were sloshing around. Meanwhile, Washington was drowning in $400 billion of federal debt with inflation hitting 6% which was a death spiral where every new bond issuance needed higher interest rates to attract suckers, which only accelerated the bleed-out. France wasn't just cashing checks; they were sending battleships to haul away physical gold while the Fed played musical chairs with reserves. Default wasn't a choice. It was inevitable. Nixon just picked how to default: either formally welch on bond payments (catastrophic) or slam the gold window shut (disguised catastrophe). He chose the quiet betrayal, letting the dollar become pure fiat so Congress could keep funding Vietnam and welfare programs without taxing a soul. That's the original sin. Not just breaking gold's back, but breaking the link between spending and accountability. Fast forward to today: $35 trillion in debt, BRICS nations stockpiling gold while ditching dollars, and your grocery bill doubling not because of "supply chains" but because we've spent fifty years printing to paper over every bad bet. Nixon didn't save the economy. He gave politicians a credit card with no limit and told your grandchildren to pick up the tab.
It didn't have enough gold to pay its bonds, so it could either keep the integrity of the dollars intact while defaulting on the bonds, or keep the integrity of the bonds (as measured in dollars) intact while defaulting on the dollars. The latter option allowed it to last a while longer before anyone would notice.
This choice was made some decades before the official day on which the gold standard ended. By 1971, it had already printed dollars to pay its bonds and didn't have nearly enough gold for foreign countries to be able to withdraw all their gold.
With the current system, they (the central bank) can just increase some people's numbers in some spreadsheets, and the effects are extremely indirect. Nominally this is in exchange for assets of equal value so the situation returns the normal after some time, but that hasn't been happening - the amount of money created this way has not been decreasing at any meaningful rate.