1. Not even remotely likely to happen.

2. Not what almost any of the parties on the ground want to happen.

3. If implemented, would almost certainly lead to atrocities.

4. The opposite of what most people who have studied this issue think is a good option.

It is the essence of not being really engaged with the problem, and trying to fit it into a mold that doesn't make any sense, and therefore coming up with solutions that will leave everyone worse off.

I highly suggest that if you want to better the lives of people in the region, especially the Palestinians (since they're currently the worst off), you advocate for some form of 2-state solution, just like almost every other peace advocate in the region.

(I'm happy to elaborate on any of the points above, if you'd like.)

Hamas wants an Arab Islamic state to rule Palestine from the river to the sea. It doesn't want equal rights and seats in the Knesset, it wants Arab Muslims to govern the land under Islamic law. This is all spelled out explicitly in their charter.

Acknowledged.

[The 2017 charter] unambiguously rejects recognition of Israel: "There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."

By itself this statement certainly sounds unambiguous. But it comes into clear conflict with the language that immediately follows:

However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.

Taken together -- I would not call this an "unambiguous" formulation of their position. There's obviously a very clear surface-level conflict between the two passages.

Holistically -- the most reasonable paraphrase seems to be: "Hamas rejects the moral legitimacy of the Zionist state. However as a practical matter, it will support the 2SS (along June 4 1967 borders) if this is determined the be the national consensus (among Palestinians), and provided the Right of Return is also granted."

The fact that it mentions "borders" is extremely significant, in that this means at least de facto, if not de jure recognition of the State of Israel.

I think your reading is consistent with what the document says. On its face, the document hints at accepting a two-state solution under the 1967 borders. The most charitable interpretation would be that Hamas is willing to consider a two state solution an ultimate settlement of the conflict, with the two states living side-by-side in peace and harmony indefinitely.

However, another possible interpretation is that Hamas is willing to accept 1967 borders in order to secure statehood, but after securing it (including lifting of the blockade, etc) it primarily intends to use its state as a base to attack Israel with more vigor and resources until Israel is destroyed. "As a practical matter" could easily be read as "as a short-term solution."

When I observe Hamas's behavior, the second interpretation seems far more likely to me. Even as the document was announced, they said "We shall not waive an inch of the Palestinian home soil, no matter what the recent pressures are and no matter how long the occupation." The formulation of the document seems designed to legitimize future attacks on Israel once the two states are established. And Hamas shows little interest in developing Gaza as a permanent home for any of its people, as you would expect if they truly see it as a core part of their future state, preferring instead to preserve refugee status for as many people as possible.

My only point is that it's important to come to an objective view of what the language of the document says, on its own terms (even if we suspect it's all on the surface and their real intentions may be entirely different). And even if the language is only surface-level -- it at least opens a door to some kind of a pathway towards a solution based on negotiation and international law, without outside observers and verified inspections of their offensive capabilities, verified elections and national referenda at regular intervals, and so forth.

Which is the only viable route out of the current state of the conflict, in my view.

Unfortunately I don't see a Palestinian state accepting international limitations on its offensive militarization. I imagine they would consider that an unacceptable limit on their sovereignty.

I also think the "right of return" is an unfortunate stumbling block that will prevent this kind of settlement. Palestinians want to turn the clock back to a time before their allies launched a war to destroy Israel, and a time before the Mizrahi were expelled from the Arab world. Practically speaking, it's asking Israel to accept an unspecified number of people who are likely to be hostile to its existence. It's hard to imagine how this doesn't lead to a sharp increase in the amount of terror attacks inside Israel.

I want to believe that you are right, and that recognizing/encouraging small steps towards agreement from both sides will ultimately lead to a lasting peace. But my fear is that it is just a ruse to gain advantage, and that accepting it at face value will lead the West to give concessions that will ultimately aid future wars that seek to destroy Israel.

People go back and forth on how much evidence there is or isn't for Sinwar and Gaza-based Hamas's rejection of the 2017 charter, but read reporting and analysis from the time, untainted by what happened on October 7, about what the objectives were for updating the charter (significantly: easing Egypt's longstanding blocade of Gaza, repairing political relationships, working around Egypt's post-Arab-Spring, post-Sisi coup suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's parent organization). Then look what happened on October 7. Like, there isn't much doubt that the 2017 document was unserious at this point?

This is purely a nerd point and not something I expect would change anybody's mind about what's happening in Gaza or what the outcomes should be.

The Charter was at the time meant seriously, at least by a certain faction within Hamas.

But with intervening events -- such as the appallingly harsh response to the 2018-2019 border protests; the storming of Al-Aqsa; and the election of the 37th Government (which brought on board not just an unsavory cast of characters, but specific plans for the continued expansion of the Settlements) -- the view took hold that Israeli society was plainly not interested in such overtures.

So as a result, the Charter got flagged and downvoted.

Since you prefer not to be centered on the Charter itself: if we are to understand why the decision was made to launch Operation Al-Aqsa Flood; an in particular how they were able to recruit so many people to agree to what was apparently promised as a suicide mission -- then I submit that is necessary to consider the whole background of events up until that time.

The 2018 "protest"

Can we just acknowledge the cruel and unduly harsh nature of the military response to the protests (which by all accounts did at least start peacefully, and from within sectors of society independent of Hamas) without having to allude to the Israeli government's snide, mocking ("fake protest") narrative of it?

As if these people have nothing to protest or be unhappy about.

The source you provided says "for every junior Hamas operative that Lavender marked, it was permissible to kill up to 15 or 20 civilians". This is clearly an upper bound, and makes no claim about how close to this they actually come.

In the same way, I might offer my customers an SLA of two nines in their contract, but never drop below three in practice. Part of effective planning is describing the worst case scenario, but that doesn't imply it will actually happen.

Even in the (ill-conceived and disastrous) Iraq and Afghanistan wars other ME nations produced a lot more help than Israel did.

More complex answers involve having an allied county in an area with a lot of Russian influence.

The history is long and complex, but keep in mind Israel ran all by itself for decades, and defended itself in multiple wars, without any US help. It was when Russia started helping Egypt that the US recruited Israel. It was not the other way around.

For a while when Russia seemed powerless people started questioning the relationship, but after Ukraine it was re-energized.

Other answers are cultural: Israel is very similar to the US and Europe, same equal rights for citzens, same democracy, same culture of freedom. And the US is allied with all countries that are similar to it.

What concrete, specific advantages from having an allied country in a distant region?

Also, Metro-North's two west-of-Hudson lines (which are co-branded/shared with NJ Transit, in terms of tracks and rolling stock) do have this same problem.

Vaccines in my memory only become broadly available April 2021 (in the US), and at that time I knew people who got Pfizer and people who got Moderna.

> Vaccines in my memory only become broadly available

Yes, that makes a difference - the vaccines that got expedited approval were provided to 'essential workers' at the time - in the US this was only Pfizer until the harshest lockdown ended. In the Eu there were 5-6 vaccines available, however Pfizer still dominated the market.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_COVID-19_vaccine_de...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford%E2%80%93AstraZeneca_COV...

When I meant approval, I meant the approval of any competitor who could provide at scale. None such vaccine was allowed until the quarantine ended. Even after that Pfizer was still being pushed against all competitors including cheaper American ones. So long story short - their lobby won.