I appreciated the historical context, but was disappointed that it seemed to fizzle to nothing at the end, just circling around "Urban warfare is messy; bummer". I mean, I was hoping that it could offer at least the basics of a strategy for any of Russia, Ukraine, Hamas or Israel to achieve a decisive victory, but couldn't find any. My mind kept yelling "What would Clausewitz do in this situation?" but left at empty-handed as I was at the start.
It actually had the gall to finish with:
> Clausewitz offers no checklist for success in cities, but rather something more valuable. What he offers is a way to think clearly ...
I'm pretty sure that a checklist for success would have been more valuable.
Clausewitz's writing (and especially On War) is very abstract and philosophical, to the point that when he mentions specifics it's almost incongruous.
There's a bit in On War where he descends from a lofty discussion on what victory means and how generals should should figure that out before the battle starts, to state abruptly that chasing a fleeing enemy is a bad idea, particularly through a forest, because it's a good way to get your forces strung out and cut down. This part is so vivid I've often wondered if he or a superior officer succumbed to enthusiasm and Clausewitz learned this lesson the hard way.
One problem with reading Clausewitz is that he was writing in an era of large set-piece battles where you had blocks of infantry that still marched around in square formation, cavalry charges and so on, though centuries-long practices were changing thanks to Napoleon's tactical innovations. Clausewitz writes in generalities rather than specifics because commanders of the time were very familiar with standard dispositions and didn't need them laid out in detail, and likewise strategic ideas like trying to ravage your enemy's supply lines and bypass forts hadn't changed significantly in millenia. Clausewitz was trying to give shape to the questions of whether and why one should go to war in the first place, how to break out of escalatory cycles so you don't end up isolated and so on. I often think he has more to say to the fields of international relations/statecraft than to pure military analysis.
If you prefer something less abstract there's a good small book by Machiavelli on the topic (confusingly also titled On War; easiest to find as a double-volume with The Prince) and of course Sun Tzu. I think the Samuel Griffith translation is the best one because Griffith was a marine officer in addition to being a scholar. Lidell-Hart's book Strategy also stands up to repeat reading and functions as a great roadmap of European military history.
Also probably to note that much of the "ideological" battles in early Europe, whether it was legitimacy for the throne or religious conflicts tended to end in sobering sieges not unlike Gaza. The difference is they actually all did starve to death when they refused to surrender. Siege of La Rochelle as the climatic battle betwen King Louis and the Huguenots, the population declined from 22k to 5k, comparable to Gaza. But the Huguenots really did loose in the end when they were too weak to resist entry.
Russia is following Clausewitzian principles pretty assiduously.
They've got a set of 3 clear objectives and their tactics on the ground, e.g.
* prioritizing attrition over the capture of territory.
* avoiding urban fighting where possible (e.g. a multi-year avoidance of zaporizhia and kharkiv).
* minimizing civilian casualties.
Reflect not only the objectives, but the desire to avoid a lot of the "messiness" the author referred to. The fact that Ukrainian civilians fear busification more than drone strikes is a testament to that.
None of the other parties (Ukraine, Hamas, Israel) appear to follow clausewitzian logic, though.
If this was remotely true, they'd have won the war already. Russian operational and strategic decision-making has been a bonfire of blazing incompetence since the beginning, which is what led to things breaking down into WWI-style attritional warfare.
Leaving the moral dimension aside, this entire war has been basically two JV teams going at it since the beginning. NATO would have wiped the floor with the Russian military based on their performance so far, and it's surprising considering what a juggernaut everyone claimed the Russian military was pre-war.
> NATO would have wiped the floor with the Russian military
Considering my interests and those of my country I would like to believe, but reality do not provide much support for such hopes.
> and it's surprising considering what a juggernaut everyone claimed the Russian military was pre-war.
It is true, but they improved immensely during 3 years of intense conflict (the same for Ukraine). On the other hand NATO has most experience in bombing people in Africa and Middle-East.
War with Russia wouldn't be the same as battle of Timbuktu.
> Considering my interests and those of my country I would like to believe, but reality do not provide much support for such hopes.
Having served in the US military for 20+ years active and reserve, the level of synchronization and coordination NATO can bring to the fight dwarfs what Russia and Ukraine have been able to achieve. The situation has degenerated into what it is because neither side could effectively coordinate action at scale, or integrate air, land, and naval power tightly. The West can. I've seen it.
> It is true, but they improved immensely during 3 years of intense conflict (the same for Ukraine). On the other hand NATO has most experience in bombing people in Africa and Middle-East.
You don't seem to understand the scenarios the US trains to. First off, there is so, so much more to counterinsurgency than just "bombing people" that it's a whole nother post. And frankly if someone describes military action as just "bombing people," it's a tell they're not speaking from a position of expertise on the issue. The US has maintained the ability to fight a major theater war since 2003; it just hasn't had to exercise it. There is a reason that in conventional combat, the US and allied militaries stomped the Iraqi military flat twice in 15 years. The failures afterward were largely at the political and strategic level from lack of clear direction or unrealistic objectives from the civilian leadership.
There is one military that could credibly challenge the US and NATO allies today, and it's not Russia, it's China.
>If this was remotely true, they'd have won the war already.
They're invading the largest country in Europe armed by a military bloc constituting 60% of world military spending. Which part of that screamed quick to you?
>Russian operational and strategic decision-making has been a bonfire of blazing incompetence
They somehow managed to achieve a body bag exchange ratio of 44:1 and an extreme busification crisis in Ukraine with a volunteer force.
It's a more impressive showing than Iraq.
>led to things breaking down into WWI-style attritional warfare.
Putin announced the strategy of attritional warfare in March 2022 after the land bridge was secured, so one could hardly argue that this wasnt the plan.
Ukraine has done a good job of playing into their hands by trying to cling on to land long past the point where it becomes defensible and getting enveloped in cauldron after cauldron.
Hence the issue where Ukrainian civilians are now more afraid of their own government's roving kidnapping gangs than living under Moscow's rule.
That part is probably going to be the real kicker in the end.
The amount of total financial support provided to Ukraine is lower than that which Russia has earned from the same bloc. And military support is the smaller fraction of this total. So, the support has been important but without Ukraine deciding to resist Russia vehemently, the Donbass would have long been conquered.
I do agree with your criticism that in certain places, such as Bakhmut or Avdiivka, Ukraine has lost many men needlessly when in an indefensible position. Saying that, Russia is making at best incremental gains for huge casualties. They certainly aren't going to conquer the rest of Donbass by this year or even by the 4th anniversary.
>The amount of total financial support provided to Ukraine is lower than that which Russia has earned from the same bloc.
The amount of aid sent during the war totaled up to about $300 billion, which is roughly equal to the Russian military budget for the same period.
Thats not counting all of the "soon to be expired" stuff they handed over in 2022/2023, declaring it was worth $0 because it would have been disposed of.
>Saying that, Russia is making at best incremental gains for huge casualties.
For every body bag they get back theyve recently been handing over 44.
Territorial gains are only relevant for them right now insofar as it serves their overriding goal of attrition.
>They certainly aren't going to conquer the rest of Donbass by this year or even by the 4th anniversary.
If it serves the overall goal of attrition im sure theyd be happy to drag it out beyond February. Theyre not on a deadline.
The problem is that the more the Ukrainian army gets hollowed out by attrition now, the faster and more complete the eventual collapse will be.
>He’s not winning on the timelines his military brass originally predicted.
Untrue. I remember them being asked for a deadline in a press conference in March 2022 and they said (verbatim) "it will take as long as it takes". Theyve not deviated from that position either, because Clausewitz.
That "3 days to kiev" thing was General Mark Milley's prediction to congress, which was later morphed by western propaganda into "Putin's goal" and is now presumed by the terminally naive to have been the overriding goal.
>Putin and Ukraine are in a stalemate
If it were stalemate the body bag exchange ratios would probably be a little lower than 44:1 and the TCC probably wouldnt be kidnapping quite so many men out doing a grocery run.
To be fair, I remember reading about a Russian state media accidentally posting an article written in advance for the capture of Kyiv, right around the time the war started. That was pretty much the assumption in the piece.
If it's the article im thinking of it proclaimed that all of Ukraine and all of Belarus were now part of a glorious "greater" Russia.
I think if they really wanted the latter they could have made it happen by now.
The leadership apparently werent saying anything at all to anyone in the first two weeks or so for opsec reasons, and that apparently led some of the state media propagandists to get a bit creative.
> Putin and Ukraine are in a stalemate. That takes Russia off the table as a near peer to the U.S.
Ukraine, with currently most capable and experienced military in Europe, supported by western countries, is losing. Slowly and while making Russia pay, but losing nonetheless. And if you consider demographics, it kinda lost already. Most people that escaped west won't get back, and many men that were forced to stay will leave soon after they will be allowed to.
For last few decades US victories were even less clear and made against countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Russians target civilian objects - apartment complexes, hospitals, metro entrances, passenger trains. Constantly do a second strike when emergency crews arrive. They use drones to hunt civillians who live near frontline.
Gazan civilian casualties eclipsed Ukrainian within about two weeks.
Militaries routinely use civilian objects for military purposes, so that these objects are targeted isnt meaningful in and of itself - like the time a pizza restaurant was targeted and it later emerged that the restaurant hosted a rather large military gathering.
Obviously because Gaza is virtually defenseless and Israel has roughly one active duty soldier for every seven adults in Gaza. It's less of a war than just a massacre.
Ukraine and Russia on the other hand are relatively evenly matched, so killing civilians is much harder.
I think you can explain Russia's poor performance somewhat from Clausewitzian principles:
"primordial violence, hatred, and enmity" - weren't really there - most Russians viewed Ukrainians as their brethren.
"Chance and Probability" - the Russians have proved pretty inflexible. I mean after they failed to take Kyiv in three days they could have gone home and saved a lot of bother, maybe keeping some lands in the south.
"Reason and Policy" - didn't make much sense. Few Russians wanted to go to war so Putin could lord it over the Ukrainians as well as the Russians. This looks more like a political move by Putin to keep power.
If Russia had actually had a clear objective to annex Ukraine they could have mobilised and knocked them out in no time but instead we have a mess and kind of stalemate which to me seems to be moving in Ukraine's favour as they can now hit most targets inside Russia.
> A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves
Checklists aren't immutable. Having clear pre-war plans and procedures doesn't preclude changing them. But going in without them almost assures defeat.
Well, yes, a "checklist" (his word) might be too much of a strawman, but what would be useful would be a strategy in the game theoretical sense - a decision mechanism of actions conditional on different situations (e.g. "If the enemy is hiding in a network of tunnel under civilian population, you should wait until ... and then randomly ..., but if they ... then reverse course and instead ...").
Quoting again from the author's closing remarks:
> Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive.
But that's so vague that I can't help but again yell "But what is decisive?!", "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?". It's almost astrology in how it doesn't say anything objectionable.
In one sense, your checklist is whatever you wrote down before starting:
> Clausewitz also famously wrote, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”
You could also make a checklist of stuff like "reduce effectiveness of enemy's forces" and "minimize damage to your own ability to wage war" - but that's basics which any upperclassman at a military academy could recite, in regard to pretty much any war ever.
It's been 2 centuries since Clausewitz was writing about military theory. He's still widely read because his ideas are big-picture abstractions. Bridging the gap between his abstractions and what to do, with whatever current-day/recent-tech forces you happen to have - that's the job of your flag officers and their staffs. Though their "checklists" will keep changing, as the war progresses.
Well said. But I'm still left with the question - have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory? If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time.
If we treat kinetic warfare as a game, I suppose you could argue that as in any other game, the more knowledgeable and more experienced the players are, the higher the likelihood of a draw. But then, seeing the harm that this is doing to the world, should we not see about changing the rules of war to reduce this likelihood and make things more decisive again, with the aim of reducing overall harm to civilians?
> have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory?
"How to win" theories - when correct - favor those with the motivation to take them seriously, and the smarts to apply them correctly. I hope that overlaps nicely (in Venn diagram terms) with your "we".
Plausibly, some wars have been prevented by military theory - because a nation analyzed their situation, and decided that starting a war would be a bad move.
> If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time.
Human "games" are generally balanced, or darn close. Vs. very few modern wars were started by anyone who thought things were nicely balanced.
> ...should we not see about changing the rules...
If you mean military tech or practices aimed at cutting such harm - 'most every modern military is forever working on that.* If you mean treaties banning land mines, or napalm, or nerve gas, or whatever - when well done, those can be quite useful. But in game terms, they are (at most) just changing the costs (in economic, human, and political terms) of making a "break the treaty" move.
*Edit: Unfortunately, they're also working on some conflicting goals - like "require even more firepower for our enemies to defeat" and "apply even more firepower, to defeat our enemies".
Military theory struggles to provide serious benefit above trite things because the actual reality of war changes every single day.
The most successful military theory is still the extreme basics: Your troops will do better when they want to do war. You need to feed troops and give them plenty of ammo. Training matters.
Adapt or die
>But then, seeing the harm that this is doing to the world, should we not see about changing the rules of war to reduce this likelihood and make things more decisive again, with the aim of reducing overall harm to civilians?
Why would I follow your "rules of war" if it causes me to lose? There is no global authority to force anyone to follow rules, that's the whole point.
It seems to me that making wars longer and less decisive helps weaker parties. Would the Vietnamese have preferred a shorter and more decisive war against the US, or Ukraine against Russia?
Shorter and more decisive wars also encourages war. If there's the possibility of winning quickly and thoroughly then you might choose to start a war. If you know it's going to be a bloody and tedious affair no matter what, you probably won't.
The modern world is remarkably peaceful compared to centuries past. We're at the point where having an active war of conquest in Europe is utterly shocking. Imagine going back to 1925 and saying "I can't believe a European country is taking parts of another European country by force, it's nuts, nobody does that!" They used to call that "Tuesday." The same is true in much of the rest of the world. And why? A lot of it is because it just doesn't work very well anymore. Russia has had very little return for 3+ years of invading Ukraine. Israel has spent two years invading Gaza so far and annexing the territory looks unlikely regardless of the military outcome. War used to be something a country might plausibly benefit from starting in some situations. It's really hard to make that case now, and that's how I want it to be.
People really don't have an appreciation for how destructive dragging a "classical" army across the countryside actually is since it hasn't happened much since the advent of the railroad.
There's a reason it was considered newsworthy and bold when Sherman did it and he was incredibly restrained because he was operating in his own country.
"What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?"
It simply depends. No situation is unique.
Israels strategy towards tunnels for example is to blow up and level everything. Ukraine does not deem that acceptable to the russian tunnels inside Ukraine.
What Russian tunnels in Ukraine? The battlefields are of very, very different sizes, and the Ukraine war is mostly not taking place in occupied cities at the moment.
What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on?
I was hoping that being "the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute" [0], the author could offer some actual advice on strategy. Or what is the institute for? Hopefully not just for writing essays.
As for Israel's strategy towards tunnels, I actually have no understanding of what's going on there, but I can just say that whatever they're doing has not been effective in achieving a decisive victory, and is thus ipso facto not a good strategy. So I'm wondering what might a good strategy have been. The author now has two years of hindsight - could he not use that time and information to offer some alternative approach?
"What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on?"
The terrain, your avaiable forces and equipment, the morale of your soldiers, the main goal of the operation, the short, mid and long term plans. Outside reactions.
Strength of enemy. Outside reactions, will the enemy get more support if X happens or less, will it matter if key target is achieved before time Y, ...
There is no magic bullet for something as complex as urban warfare.
If you want to level all, just use a nuke. But there seems to be reasons, why that is not a valid option.
If you go with lots of ground troops, you will have casualties. Here the question how much is acceptable to your own population.
If you go fast, you achieve a different effect then going slow. Etc. Etc etc.
The issue is mainly the hostages, as any tunnel or building may contain one that really slows the pace of advance considerably and ironically increases palestinian suffering
The checklist is one's own ethics and morale guideposts --- every interaction with others has to be done with a consideration for the long-term strategic goals rather than short-term gains --- Clausewitz argues that the will of the people of whom the military is an extension of and their ethics and mores have to be taken into account and all actions done in accord with what will make an acceptable news story.
Consider the old adage:
>Never do something which you wouldn't want your grandparents to read about in a newspaper, or to discuss with them over Sunday dinner.
By extension, a military force should:
>Never do anything which when shown on the evening news would result in a Congressional inquiry (or a War Crimes Tribunal).
I'm all for "Be excellent to each other", but in war, the first and foremost consideration is whether the strategy is effective. I'm not a big Clausewitz scholar, but I can't imagine that he or any other general would accept a strategy that prioritises the well-being of the opposing side to the point of their own side admitting defeat.
As I see it, the only way that we can have "Rules of War" is by proving that a war can be won while maintaining them. Otherwise (and unless you have a magic wand to make humans non-aggressive), these rules are worse than useless, because they limit the more ethical side, while making them lose to the less ethical.
Friend, I have respect to where you are coming from, and ask you to please think a little longer term.
You don't prioritize the well-being of the other side, but you do want to avoid radicalizing them. The more reasons they have to surrender, the more likely they are to surrender, thus ending the conflict sooner AND keeping the end conditions one they are comfortable living under.
If instead they feel they are in a fight to the death, then you have a much tougher battle on your hand because they will fight to the death. You'll still win (maybe) but it's going to cost you in personelle and time and money.
Next aspect. Moral of your troops. Everyone wants to be a hero, very few people join the military because they want to kill. And those that are in it to kill tend to be toxic leaders which is really bad for the rest of the team.
"Rules of war"/"rules of engagement" are methods that allow your troops to maintain their humanity and sense of purpose under horrific situations. You give up that and you are now undercutting the fighting power of your own forces.
The military did not come up with these ideas to make themselves weak. They came up with them and enforced them because they are the source of strength.
But that's the question - how do you fight honorably and win? How many examples can you offer (from any time in history), where the winning side conducted the campaign in a "gentlemanly fashion" (or however you want to call it), won, and got the respect of the losing side and lasting peace?
To address your concern-- if two people are fighting and one thinks "I won't hit below the belt" that person is at a tactical disadvantage. Even worse if they think the other side has also agreed to that rule.
So in that sense you are absolutely correct.
But I invite you to think bigger. If one side lays siege to another side's city, and offers terms of surrender, the city needs to believe that the terms will be honored otherwise they don't surrender.
Which is a large part of European history during the period from the middle ages up until Napoleon figured out how to use artillery, i.e. hundreds of years of examples where "fighting honorably" was the winning strategy.
Notice that Germany and Japan are now strong allies.
Also notice that many people think the cause of WWII was that the WWI surrender forced unsustainable terms on Germany thus fueling the resentment that lead to WWII.
> Also notice that many people think the cause of WWII was that the WWI surrender forced unsustainable terms on Germany thus fueling the resentment that lead to WWII.
And many historians dispute it. Partly because those terms were standard for the time and better then what Germans themselves planned to enact after they win.
And partly because the German population never believed they lost the war. They believed they would winning absent "stab in the back". That is why the allies insisted on actually conquering Germany with no in between solution. The victory had to be absolute.
I wouldn't quite say that the former Confederate states fully respected the Union's victory as saying something good about the North [0], and in some ways still don't, but otherwise it is a good example.
if you can't count on your troops to be disciplined enough to follow your rules of engagement, how can you count on their discipline to follow your other orders? If you cannot show them that you are also disciplined, how do you expect them to maintain their respect for you as a leader?
If you don't have honor, what are you fighting for? Troop moral is what wins wars.
what's worse than death? Not having anything worth living for.
very very few people find honor in being the most evil person. And those few who do make very bad leaders; you either avoid having them in your armed forces or you limit their impact.
If one of your squadmates is an "I'll do anything to win" person, how can you trust them not to ditch you if that is their best survival option? Prisoner's dilema situations are common in battle
I encourage you to visit a US military cemetery. You will sometimes see shrines to the military virtues. Courage, honor, pride, family, discipline all rank pretty high.
In WWII the Allies didn't take any steps to avoid radicalizing the other side. We implemented starvation blockades and fire bombed cities, killing millions of enemy civilians. They surrendered unconditionally because they were utterly destroyed and had no more capability it resist.
I think the lesson is that you can never be sure that you will meet your military objectives—failure is always a possibility—and the blowback from that failure will be more limited if you appear to have conducted your war with adequate respect for noncombatants.
Failing to conquer a nation (or depose its government, or secure some land, or defend a border, or whatever your objective is) may be shrugged off by your own nation, and you may even be able to normalize relations after some time. But if you abuse the noncombatant population, you often create bitter enemies, generational hatred, and global pressures on your society from third party observers. In the worst case this eventually escalates to mutual threats of genocide and total war.
Even if a nation wins a conflict through sheer brutality, they may lose the occupation, or the reconstruction, or good relations with important partners, or all of the above. And they may create an enemy who will one day return with a vengeance.
From my reading of history, there's no straightforward correspondence between the ethics of the winning side and its ability to have good relations with the losing side. As a clear anti-example, in later stages of WW2, the allied forces were very willing to engage in attacks on population centers to achieve a decisive victory faster (particularly: Dresden, Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and the resulting relationships between the allied countries and Germany and Japan could not have been more positive even if the most optimistic poet in 1944 were to written lyric poetry about the best possible future.
To be clear, I'm not advocating for cruelty, but I'm wondering if going back to an approach of "surrender or we'll kill you all" would save more lives than the current situation of "do everything you can to avoid doing too much harm at any one time", which ends up prolonging conflicts indefinitely.
> resulting relationships between the allied countries and Germany and Japan could not have been more positive
I think there may have been a "lesser evil" aspect to that. The Allies had good relationships with West Germany almost immediately after the war because they were saving the defeated Germans from the USSR. Japan reconciled with the USSR but there are still tensions between Japan, Korea, and China over the war.
In both cases the aggressors were the first to engage in atrocities, and their atrocities were much more severe than those inflicted upon them. So both seem like a unique case. Additionally, both were part of a global conflict, which is uncommon. In a global conflict there aren’t many bystanders who can effectively implement sanctions or apply diplomatic pressure.
> I'm wondering if going back to an approach of "surrender or we'll kill you all" would save more lives than the current situation
This is just as likely to provoke a “fight to the death” response from the defender which is often enough to prevent you from achieving your objectives. There are very few large conflicts where the objective is simply “eliminate the defenders”.
The obvious counter example is WWII. The victorious Allied forces conducted widespread strategic bombing campaigns and starvation blockades against Axis civilian targets. This was highly effective and saved the lives of many Allied personnel but judged against some modern criteria could have been considered "war crimes": for example, see the fire bombing of Dresden. None of the Allied leaders were put in front of a tribunal because the strategy worked and Congress was fully on board. The uncomfortable reality is that sometimes the only practical way to win and preserve your own forces is to massacre enemy civilians on an industrial scale.
The strategic bombing campaign absolutely reduced Axis manufacturing capacity and fuel supplies. There is no serious dispute about that point. There is some academic dispute about whether it was the most effective use of Allied resources but by the second half of the war the US had plenty resources to spare so that dispute is kind of moot.
It actually had the gall to finish with:
> Clausewitz offers no checklist for success in cities, but rather something more valuable. What he offers is a way to think clearly ...
I'm pretty sure that a checklist for success would have been more valuable.