> A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves
Checklists aren't immutable. Having clear pre-war plans and procedures doesn't preclude changing them. But going in without them almost assures defeat.
Well, yes, a "checklist" (his word) might be too much of a strawman, but what would be useful would be a strategy in the game theoretical sense - a decision mechanism of actions conditional on different situations (e.g. "If the enemy is hiding in a network of tunnel under civilian population, you should wait until ... and then randomly ..., but if they ... then reverse course and instead ...").
Quoting again from the author's closing remarks:
> Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive.
But that's so vague that I can't help but again yell "But what is decisive?!", "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?". It's almost astrology in how it doesn't say anything objectionable.
In one sense, your checklist is whatever you wrote down before starting:
> Clausewitz also famously wrote, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”
You could also make a checklist of stuff like "reduce effectiveness of enemy's forces" and "minimize damage to your own ability to wage war" - but that's basics which any upperclassman at a military academy could recite, in regard to pretty much any war ever.
It's been 2 centuries since Clausewitz was writing about military theory. He's still widely read because his ideas are big-picture abstractions. Bridging the gap between his abstractions and what to do, with whatever current-day/recent-tech forces you happen to have - that's the job of your flag officers and their staffs. Though their "checklists" will keep changing, as the war progresses.
Well said. But I'm still left with the question - have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory? If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time.
If we treat kinetic warfare as a game, I suppose you could argue that as in any other game, the more knowledgeable and more experienced the players are, the higher the likelihood of a draw. But then, seeing the harm that this is doing to the world, should we not see about changing the rules of war to reduce this likelihood and make things more decisive again, with the aim of reducing overall harm to civilians?
> have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory?
"How to win" theories - when correct - favor those with the motivation to take them seriously, and the smarts to apply them correctly. I hope that overlaps nicely (in Venn diagram terms) with your "we".
Plausibly, some wars have been prevented by military theory - because a nation analyzed their situation, and decided that starting a war would be a bad move.
> If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time.
Human "games" are generally balanced, or darn close. Vs. very few modern wars were started by anyone who thought things were nicely balanced.
> ...should we not see about changing the rules...
If you mean military tech or practices aimed at cutting such harm - 'most every modern military is forever working on that.* If you mean treaties banning land mines, or napalm, or nerve gas, or whatever - when well done, those can be quite useful. But in game terms, they are (at most) just changing the costs (in economic, human, and political terms) of making a "break the treaty" move.
*Edit: Unfortunately, they're also working on some conflicting goals - like "require even more firepower for our enemies to defeat" and "apply even more firepower, to defeat our enemies".
Military theory struggles to provide serious benefit above trite things because the actual reality of war changes every single day.
The most successful military theory is still the extreme basics: Your troops will do better when they want to do war. You need to feed troops and give them plenty of ammo. Training matters.
Adapt or die
>But then, seeing the harm that this is doing to the world, should we not see about changing the rules of war to reduce this likelihood and make things more decisive again, with the aim of reducing overall harm to civilians?
Why would I follow your "rules of war" if it causes me to lose? There is no global authority to force anyone to follow rules, that's the whole point.
It seems to me that making wars longer and less decisive helps weaker parties. Would the Vietnamese have preferred a shorter and more decisive war against the US, or Ukraine against Russia?
Shorter and more decisive wars also encourages war. If there's the possibility of winning quickly and thoroughly then you might choose to start a war. If you know it's going to be a bloody and tedious affair no matter what, you probably won't.
The modern world is remarkably peaceful compared to centuries past. We're at the point where having an active war of conquest in Europe is utterly shocking. Imagine going back to 1925 and saying "I can't believe a European country is taking parts of another European country by force, it's nuts, nobody does that!" They used to call that "Tuesday." The same is true in much of the rest of the world. And why? A lot of it is because it just doesn't work very well anymore. Russia has had very little return for 3+ years of invading Ukraine. Israel has spent two years invading Gaza so far and annexing the territory looks unlikely regardless of the military outcome. War used to be something a country might plausibly benefit from starting in some situations. It's really hard to make that case now, and that's how I want it to be.
People really don't have an appreciation for how destructive dragging a "classical" army across the countryside actually is since it hasn't happened much since the advent of the railroad.
There's a reason it was considered newsworthy and bold when Sherman did it and he was incredibly restrained because he was operating in his own country.
"What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?"
It simply depends. No situation is unique.
Israels strategy towards tunnels for example is to blow up and level everything. Ukraine does not deem that acceptable to the russian tunnels inside Ukraine.
What Russian tunnels in Ukraine? The battlefields are of very, very different sizes, and the Ukraine war is mostly not taking place in occupied cities at the moment.
What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on?
I was hoping that being "the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute" [0], the author could offer some actual advice on strategy. Or what is the institute for? Hopefully not just for writing essays.
As for Israel's strategy towards tunnels, I actually have no understanding of what's going on there, but I can just say that whatever they're doing has not been effective in achieving a decisive victory, and is thus ipso facto not a good strategy. So I'm wondering what might a good strategy have been. The author now has two years of hindsight - could he not use that time and information to offer some alternative approach?
"What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on?"
The terrain, your avaiable forces and equipment, the morale of your soldiers, the main goal of the operation, the short, mid and long term plans. Outside reactions.
Strength of enemy. Outside reactions, will the enemy get more support if X happens or less, will it matter if key target is achieved before time Y, ...
There is no magic bullet for something as complex as urban warfare.
If you want to level all, just use a nuke. But there seems to be reasons, why that is not a valid option.
If you go with lots of ground troops, you will have casualties. Here the question how much is acceptable to your own population.
If you go fast, you achieve a different effect then going slow. Etc. Etc etc.
The issue is mainly the hostages, as any tunnel or building may contain one that really slows the pace of advance considerably and ironically increases palestinian suffering
